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Foreword
We live in one world. We need to understand
and respect each other, live peacefully together and
live up to the best of our respective traditions.
That is not as easy as we might like it to be.
But that is all the more reason to try harder,
with all our tools and all our will.
Kofi Annan
7 December 2004
Europe is a continent of immigration. It must, therefore, also be a continent in which integration poli-
cies bolster social cohesion. Yet this is currently not the norm in Europe. Too often, European member
states struggle to incorporate newcomers into society and to provide their children with equal life op-
portunities. Successful integration can induce a chain reaction spanning successive generations.
Effective integration policies can be path-setting in a positive way because well integrated adults can
help young people navigate society and give them a healthy sense of belonging to it. If integration
fails, however, social exclusion can be compounded from one generation to the next. Therefore, inte-
gration policies can have an exponential impact on society and must be carefully formulated. Policy-
makers at the EU and subsidiary levels have a heightened interest in better understanding how the
present kaleidoscope of integration programs impact society and how societies ‘perform’ with regard
to social integration. “Benchmarking integration” are new buzz words in policy-making.
Currently, integration policies are evolving rapidly and in contradictory directions across the EU. A
wide variety of policies on fostering and managing integration processes have emerged around the
continent. Germany is one of many European Union countries which has recently reformed its immi-
gration and integration laws. At the EU level, immigration and integration issues are at the top of the
common freedom, security and justice agenda of member states. For example, the German EU Presi-
dency in 2007 expanded the mandate of the NCPI to improve integration policies through enhanced
open coordination among EU member states. The French EU Presidency has made immigration is-
sues a priority by putting the EU Pact on Immigration and Asylum high on its Presidency’s agenda in
2008. The EU has been trying to improve migration and integration policies for some time. For exam-
ple, it put forward Common Basic Principles on Integration in 2004, in an attempt to harmonize what
member states mean by integration and what integration should achieve.
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In the past few years a wide range of benchmarking methods has emerged in Europe. These devel-
opments have great potential to improve integration policy; but integration benchmarking architectures
have yet to mature into a set of effective policy-making tools. Yet integration policies could greatly
benefit from such tools to benchmark integration. With that in mind, the Bertelsmann Foundation
commissioned this study on benchmarking integration to untangle the key issues within the debate
and to move it forward. This innovative study, authored by Sergio Carrera and supervised by Elspeth
Guild, analyses the legal and policy context in which benchmarking integration is taking place. It ex-
poses weaknesses in current benchmarking methods. Furthermore, it distils the components of these
policy tools that need to be improved, and makes policy recommendations on how to move the
benchmarking debate in the EU forward in an effective way.
We are confident that this study will make a positive contribution to the important debate now under-
way on benchmarking integration in Europe.
Ulrich Kober Christal Morehouse
Director, Integration Program Project Manager, Integration Program
Bertelsmann Foundation Bertelsmann Foundation
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Introduction
Integration policies regarding third-country nationals (TCNs) in the European Union (EU) have been
subject to multifaceted normative developments and policy processes since 1999. At that time, mem-
ber states began transferring certain responsibilities for immigration policies to EU institutions. The
member states have often considered integration policy a strategic priority for the area of freedom,
security and justice (AFSJ) and for the establishment of a common immigration policy in the EU. Yet,
the principle of subsidiarity has prevailed in this policy area. The member states perceive immigration
policies to be at the heart of national sovereignty and their exclusive authority. This intergovernmental
logic has led to the emergence of an alternative policy framework. The alternative framework fosters
the Europeanization and convergence of policy through means different from those already provided
by the traditional Community method of cooperation. The EU framework on integration now makes
use of non-legislative policy-making and soft-law governance techniques. They are based on knowl-
edge-sharing, policy coordination and the exchange of information. Benchmarking and indicators are
central tools thereof.
Since the end of 2002, the EU framework on integration has developed slowly but progressively. It is
now composed of several substantive and institutional mechanisms. These include a set of common
basic principles on integration (CBPs), two Handbook[s] on Integration for Policy-makers and Practi-
tioners, three Annual Report[s] on Migration and Integration, the National Contact Points on
Integration (NCPI), a forthcoming European integration forum, an integration website, as well as the
European integration fund (EIF). The common EU framework on integration constitutes innovative,
multilevel governance in the field of integration concerning TCNs at the EU level. It comprises a pack-
age of non-coercive regulatory tools and diversified supranational networks. The result is a quasi-open
method of coordination (OMC) for policy-making in integration.
In this context, benchmarking has been presented as one of the main elements upon which the EU
framework on integration is supposed to operate and further develop in the years to come. The Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA) Council meeting of 19 November 2004 included benchmarking in the CBPs.
CBP 11 on the European criteria for indicators and benchmarks states that these can be used to “ad-
just policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective”.1
The JHA Council Conclusions on Strengthening Integration Policies in the European Union by promot-
ing Unity in Diversity of 12–13 June 2007 gave the political mandate for the European Commission to
promote the development of common indicators and indices. Member states can use these on a vol-
untary basis to assess their own policies. Benchmarking integration constitutes one of the key
future policy priorities of growing importance in the EU. This is especially true for the EU
framework on integration and common immigration policy. The Commission Communication on a
1 See Council of the European Union, 2618th Meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, 14615/04, Brus-
sels, 19 November 2004.
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Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools of 17 June 2008 reasserted the
importance of using benchmarking as a policy tool. It identified the development of benchmarking,
common indicators, adequate statistical data, mutual learning and exchange of best practices
as among the crucial political priorities guiding common European immigration policy in the
near future. It is, therefore, an ideal time to examine the conceptual premises and practical method-
ologies through which benchmarking the integration of TCNs at the EU level is being conducted. It is
also important at this time to evaluate the current deficits and prospects for new benchmarking archi-
tectures and techniques.
This study assesses the nature, scope and implications of benchmarking integration by looking at the
current deficits of soft-law policies and the potential for new supranational architectures for fostering
social inclusion. This study has six chapters: Chapter One looks at European normative approaches to
the integration of TCNs. It analyzes the integration concepts that have been embedded in EU laws
and policies since the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere Program. Special attention is paid to
regulatory components of integration in EU immigration law and the EU framework on integration.
Chapter Two looks at the policy context within which benchmarking is being carried out in the EU. It
focuses on the relationship between the OMC and integration policies. This chapter also evaluates the
ways in which integration has been benchmarked in selected projects carried out by civil society, aca-
demia and local authorities. Chapter Three evaluates integration benchmarking techniques concerning
TCNs in the EU. Chapter Four examines some of the weaknesses inherent in benchmarking. It does
so by cross-referencing current normative European approaches to integration with the state-of-the-art
integration benchmarking methods, presented in Chapter Two. Chapter Five explores the potential
benchmarking tools could have if their architecture could be improved. Finally, Chapter Six puts for-
ward a set of policy recommendations.
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1 The Normative Framework on Integration in the EU: Toward a
Common European Approach?
From the very beginning, integration has been at the core of EU policies. One of the main rationales of
the European integration process has been the establishment of an internal market.2 Integration in this
context was understood as a process facilitating the mobility of EU-national migrant workers across
the internal borders of member states, in which they also enjoy equality, non-discrimination, family
reunification and a secure juridical status.3 The EU has significantly modified its understanding of
integration while developing a common EU framework on integration concerning TCNs as part
of its AFSJ. Integration has become a component of migration management, describing a con-
dition under which TCNs have access to rights, security and social inclusion.
Certain member states have consistently opposed the development of a common EU immigration pol-
icy. They have attempted to keep a high degree of sovereignty and discretional power over policy in
this area. The EU has brought convergence to member states’ migration policies to some extent; yet
its principle of subsidiary stands in opposition to this convergence. Hence, two separate normative
processes have emerged on integration: EU immigration law and the EU framework on integra-
tion. Since 1999, there has been a fundamental transformation in how the EU and its member states
conceive integration in these two processes. This transformation has major repercussions for how
benchmarking is, or could be, conducted at the EU level.
1.1 EU Immigration Law
After the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force, the European Council held a meeting in the city of
Tampere on 15–16 October 1999. The Presidency Conclusions, referred to as the Tampere Program,
presented a roadmap of policy priorities and a package of overarching objectives guiding the latter.4
The Council called for the adoption of certain tenets to guide the EU’s approach to integration. These
are referred to as the EU fair and near-equality treatment paradigm. They comprise the following:
2 C. Barnard and J. Scott (eds), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises, Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2002; see also P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Sixth Edition, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007.
3 Groenendijk (2006) has argued that “[i]n the first regulation on the free movement of workers…the right to fam-
ily reunification and the equal access of family members to education and employment…were explicitly
recognised, with the aim of assisting the integration of the worker”. See K. Groenendijk, “Integration Policy and
Community Law”, in S. Carrera (ed.), The Nexus between Immigration, Integration and Citizenship in the EU,
Collective Conference Volume, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, April 2006(a), pp. 9–11; see also
K. Groenendijk, “Access of Third-Country Nationals to Employment under the New EC Migration Law”, in F.
Julien-Laferriere, H. Labaye and O. Edström (eds), The European Immigration and Asylum Policy: Critical As-
sessment Five Years after the Amsterdam Treaty, Brussels: Bruylant, 2005, pp. 141–74.
4 European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council of 15–16 October, SN 200/1/99,
Brussels, 1999.
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fair treatment toward legally-resident TCNs, the development of a vigorous integration policy that
grants legal TCNs rights and obligations comparable to EU citizens,5 and the defining of long-term
residents’ rights that are “as near as possible” to those of EU citizens.6
The European Commission put forward a package of legislative proposals according to the Tampere
vision of integration. The Council Directives 2003/109 on the status of long-term residents who are
TCNs of 25 November 2003 and 2003/86 on the right to family reunification of 22 September 2003
represent the most relevant legal acts so far adopted in the area of legal immigration (i.e. conditions
for the legal admission and stay of TCNs). These two instruments form part of a European-wide
framework limiting the degree of member states’ discretion over migration and provide a ceiling of
common standards and EU-wide rights/guarantees.7 They also constitute a legal framework of ‘mini-
mums’, leaving wide discretion to member states concerning their national implementation.
During Council negotiations, the content of these Directives and the concept of integration contained
in them evolved significantly. Compared with the Tampere Program, these Directives contain more
restrictive understandings of integration. The Council substantially changed the concept of inte-
gration contained in the first versions of both initiatives. A group of member states pushed for the
framing of integration in line with their respective immigration systems. Integration was conceived as
another regulatory mechanism at the EU level. Through integration measures, states could manage a
foreign national’s access to a residence permit and protection against expulsion. Hence, the meaning
and function of integration in EU law diverged from the way it was conceived in the Tampere
Program.
The Directive on the right to family reunification 2003/868 sets out the common standards and criteria
for TCNs residing lawfully in the territory of a member state to be reunited with their family members.9
The Council agreed on the Directive’s content in February 2003, and adopted it in December of the
5 Para. 18 states that “[a] more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting them rights and obligations
comparable to those of EU citizens. It should also enhance non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural
life and develop measures against racism and xenophobia.”
6 Para. 21 reads as follows: “The legal status of third country nationals should be approximated to that of Mem-
ber States’ nationals. A person, who has resided legally in a Member State for a period of time to be determined
and who holds a long-term residence permit, should be granted in that Member State a set of uniform rights
which are as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens.”
7 K. Groenendijk, “Citizens and Third Country Nationals: Differential Treatment or Discrimination?”, in J.Y. Carlier
and E. Guild (eds), The Future of Free Movement of Persons in the EU, Collection du Centre des Droits de
L’Homme de la’Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels: Bruylant, 2006(b), pp. 79–101.
8 Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family re-
unification, OJ L 251/12, 3.10.2003.
9 K. Groenendijk, R. Fernhout, D. Van Dam, R. Van Oers and T. Strik, The Family Reunification Directive in EU
Member States: The First Year of Implementation, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2007; see also H.
Oosterom-Staples, “The Family Reunification Directive: A Tool Preserving Member State Interest or Conducive
to Family Reunification Unity?”, in A. Baldaccini, E. Guild and H. Toner (eds), Whose Freedom, Security and
Justice? EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007, pp. 451–88; and also K.
Groenendijk, “Family Reunification as a Right under Community Law”, European Journal of Migration and Law,
Vol. 8, No. 2, 2006(c), pp. 215–30.
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same year.10 The outcome of the Council negotiations (mainly owing to pressure by Germany, the
Netherlands and Austria) led to the following innovative approaches to integration in Articles 4.1 and 7
of the Directive. According to Article 4.1,
[w]here a child is aged over 12 years and arrives independently from the rest of his/her
family, the Member State may, before authorising entry and residence under this Directive,
verify whether he or she meets a condition for integration provided for by its existing legis-
lation on the date of implementation of this Directive. (emphasis added)
Integration is conceived as a legal measure and a means for member states to control migra-
tion. In this context, integration is a condition on the EU right to family reunification and other
related rights. A similar understanding of integration is contained in Article 7.2: 
Member States may require third country nationals to comply with integration measures, in
accordance with national law. With regard to the refugees and/or family members of refu-
gees referred to in Article 12 the integration measures referred to in the first subparagraph
may only be applied once the persons concerned have been granted family reunification.
(emphasis added)
Since integration measures apply to refugees and their family members only after they have been
granted family reunification, it implicitly allows for integration measures to apply to all other TCNs even
before they have been granted this right (i.e. when they are still abroad in their country of origin).11
This concept of integration transforms it into a policy tool that affects prospective immigrants in their
countries of origin. The prospective TCN is obliged to fulfill integration criteria set by the mem-
ber state in which they want to live (knowledge of language and values/way of life), even before
actually entering the EU.
Directive 2003/109 considers long-term residents to be those TCNs who have legally resided in a
member state for five years. It establishes a set of rights and freedoms12 for long-term TCNs and
grants them the right to move and reside in a second member state.13 The Council discussed the Di-
rective at length before it was adopted on 25 November 2003. The final version of the Directive was
significantly diluted compared with the original version. The same group of member states that shifted
10 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Right to Family Reunification, COM(1999) 638
final, Brussels, 1 December 1999.
11 This possibility is confirmed when looking at the implementation of the Directive in some member states. See
the Loi relatif à la maîtrise de l’immigration, à l’intégration et à l’asile n° 2007-1631, version consolidée 21 no-
vembre 2007 (retrieved from http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr).
12 Council of the European Union, Council Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are
long-term residents, 2003/109, OJ L 16/44, 23.1.2004; see also European Commission, Proposal for a Council
Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, COM(2001)127 final,
Brussels, 13 March 2001.
13 K. Groenendijk, “The Long-Term Residents Directive, Denizenship and Integration”, in A. Baldaccini, E. Guild
and H. Toner (eds), Whose Freedom, Security and Justice? EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, Ox-
ford: Hart Publishing, 2007, pp. 429–50.
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the integration paradigm in Directive 2003/86 pushed for a concept of integration in line with their im-
migration laws and political agendas in Directive 2003/109 as well. The final version of the Directive
included two articles making reference to integration as a “condition” or “measure”.14 Article 5.2 states
that “Member States may require third-country nationals to comply with integration conditions, in ac-
cordance with national law”.15 The Directive leaves member states the authority to implement
mandatory integration programs for TCNs before granting them a residence permit. Article 5 does not
include a definition of “integration conditions”. In addition, the member states maintain wide discretion
to test and scrutinize whether TCNs are ‘successfully integrated’.16
In both Directives 2003/109 (Article 5.2) and 2003/86 (Article 4.1), the term “integration conditions”
allows member states to make integration measures obligatory for TCNs. In the case of non-
fulfillment, member states could deny TCNs EC long-term resident status, the EC right to fam-
ily reunification and/or all the other related rights. The term “integration measures” conveys less
authority to member states, and relates to policies such as expecting long-term TCN residents ‘to
make a certain effort’ regarding integration by participating in language or integration courses.
1.2 The EU Framework on Integration and Policy Coordination at the EU Level
Since 2001, there has been a common understanding at the EU level that integration policies govern-
ing TCNs should be made primarily by national and local authorities. The principle of subsidiarity has
taken preference over attempts to Europeanize this policy. The failure of the Communication on an
Open Method of Coordination for the Community Immigration Policy (COM(2001) 387) of July 2003,
whose content is analyzed in Chapter Two, encouraged the Commission to develop an alternative EU
framework on integration. Similar to EU immigration law, the concept of integration as contained in
the EU framework on integration has experienced a substantial paradigm shift.
The concept of integration has evolved dynamically since the beginning of the EU framework on inte-
gration, owing to the increased exchange of national experiences, programs and policies among the
member states. This development also stems from the work of the NCPI and expert exchanges at the
European level that feed into the handbooks on integration. This evolution becomes apparent when
one examines the CBPs, the European Commission’s publications and the EIF.
14 Article 15.3, provides that that “Member States may require third-country nationals to comply with integration
measures, in accordance with national law. This condition shall not apply where the third-country nationals con-
cerned have been required to comply with integration conditions in order to be granted long-term resident status,
in accordance with the provisions of Article 5(2). Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, the persons
concerned may be required to attend language courses.”
15 See Council Directive 2003/109, op. cit.
16 S. Carrera, “Integration as a process of inclusion for migrants? The case of long-term residents in the EU”, in
H. Schneider (ed.), Migration, Integration and Citizenship: A Challenge for Europe’s Future, 2005, pp. 109–38.
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The meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 14–15 October 2002 represented the first oc-
casion in which the Council decided to move the EU framework on integration forward.17 Great
importance was given to the exchange of information, which could lead to the establishment of ‘best
practices’. The Commission fostered the process by presenting the Communication on Immigration,
Integration and Employment (COM(2003) 336) on 3 June 2003, which called for a “more coherent
European framework for integration” that would reinforce “policy coordination”.18 The following under-
standing of integration was provided:
Integration should be understood as a two-way process based on mutual rights and corre-
sponding obligations of legally resident third country nationals and the host society which
provides for full participation of the immigrant. This implies on the one hand that it is the re-
sponsibility of the host society to ensure that the formal rights of immigrants are in place in
such a way that the individual has the possibility of participating in economic, social, cul-
tural and civic life and on the other, that immigrants respect the fundamental norms and
values of the host society and participate actively in the integration process, without having
to relinquish their own identity.19 (emphasis added)
The European Council at Thessaloniki of June 2003 called for the development of a policy on integra-
tion that would focus on granting TCNs rights and obligations “comparable” to EU citizens, and
proposed the development of a set of “common basic principles for integration of immigrants”.20 These
Conclusions meant that integration had reached the EU’s policy agenda.21 They were a strong political
statement from the Council for the Commission to advance European cooperation in this area.
1.2.1 The NCPI and the Handbooks on Integration
The establishment of the NCPI was one of the first outputs of the JHA Conclusions of October 2002.
The European Commission created this transnational forum of experts from member states’ national
ministries responsible for integration (more specifically, Ministries of Interior,22 Ministries of Labor and
Social Affairs23 and Ministries of Integration24). The Commission (DG for Justice, Freedom and Secu-
17 Justice and Home Affairs and Civil Protection, 2455th Council Meeting, 12894/02, Luxembourg, 14–15 October
2002.
18 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
Immigration, Integration and Employment, COM(2003) 336, Brussels, 3 June 2003.
19 Ibid.
20 European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council of 19–20 June 2003, SN
11638/03, Brussels, 1 October.
21 H. Urth, “Building a Momentum for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union”, Euro-
pean Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2005, pp. 163–80.
22 This pertains to, among others, Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia, the UK (Home Office) and
Romania (Ministry of Administration and Interior).
23 This includes Finland, Poland, Spain, Lithuania and Bulgaria.
24 This relates to Denmark, Belgium (Cabinet for Minister for Public Office, Social Integration, Big Cities’ Policy
and Equal Opportunities), France, Latvia, Estonia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands (Ministry of Justice), Sweden
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rity (JFS)) chairs the network. The first NCPI meeting took place in Brussels in March 2003. Since
then the tasks of the network have become more consolidated. These tasks encompass exchanging
information, monitoring integration progress nationally and strengthening policy coordination (‘best
practices’) at the national and EU levels. They have contributed to the most relevant tools of the EU
framework on integration, such as the handbooks on integration.
1.2.1.1 The Handbook on Integration for Policy-Makers and Practitioners
The Migration Policy Group (MPG) elaborated the first edition of the Handbook on Integration for Pol-
icy-Makers and Practitioners on behalf of the European Commission (DG JFS) in November 2004.25
The book’s objective was “to act as a driver for the exchange of information and best practices be-
tween the Member States”.26 It was carried out in close cooperation with the NCPI and was based on
the outcomes of a number of seminars. Policy-makers and practitioners participated in the seminars.
They exchanged information on orientation programs for immigrants, immigrant civic and political par-
ticipation and integration indicators. The handbook is structured in three chapters and deals with those
issues. The document explains the way in which the MPG (which issued discussion papers and
drafted the conclusions of the seminars) and the NCPI (which provided examples of best practices
and promising initiatives on integration from their own countries) also provided substantial input to the
final text.
The two kinds of integration programs from which the handbook draws best practices are the orienta-
tion courses for newly arrived immigrants and immigrant civic-participation initiatives. It also explores
the use of integration indicators and benchmarks, identifies priority areas and best practices at the
national level, and presents a set of policy recommendations (‘catalogue of inspiring ideas’) on inte-
gration policies. These are designed to aid policy-makers and practitioners. Best practice was defined
as “approaches that have been shown, through research and evaluation, to be effective and sustain-
able and produce outstanding results, and that can be applicable in and adapted to a different
situation”.27 Concerning the use of indicators, they aim at measuring “the real situation of immigrants
and identifying the extent to which integration is progressing”.28 The handbook goes on to state that “a
successful use of indicators builds on appropriate data collection and on the careful selection of indi-
cators in line with the overall targets of integration”.
(Ministry of Justice), Ireland (Reception and Integration Agency), and Hungary (Ministry of Justice and Law En-
forcement).
25 J. Niessen and Y. Schibel, Handbook on Integration for Policy-makers and Practitioners, DG Justice, Freedom
and Security, European Commission, Brussels, November 2004.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 11.
28 Ibid., p. 54.
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1.2.1.2 The Second Edition of the Handbook
The second edition of the handbook was published in May 2007.29 It contains ‘good practices’ and
‘lessons learned’ from the experience of policy-makers and practitioners in Europe. The introduction
starts by making reference to the important role the handbook plays in initiating “a larger policy proc-
ess in the field of integration in the European Union, notably the development of the European
framework on integration”.30 The introductory section of the handbook starts as follows:
Integration is not easy to plan: it is a long-term process, and it is non-linear. An interna-
tional political event or a criminal act can set back integration processes significantly.
Integration is also multi-faceted, demanding a capacity for adaptation…including [by] immi-
grants themselves.
It then poses the question: What does integration mean? It advocates setting aside conceptual de-
bates31 and focusing on a more pragmatic approach to understanding integration by looking at its
“outcomes in terms of social and economic mobility, education, health, housing, social services, and
societal participation”.32 The following are considered key for improving what it calls “immigrant’s out-
comes”: 1) the elimination of inequalities through civic citizenship for legal residents, and 2) the
acquisition of skills (“learning to learn”) through language proficiency and training/education (“empow-
erment also reinforces knowledge”).
Chapter Four of the handbook’s second edition, entitled “Integration Governance”, looks at the struc-
tures, mechanisms, processes and forms of collaboration that comprise a framework for integration
policies and practices. It argues that general policy goals can only be implemented through careful
planning33 and evaluation of the appropriateness and quality of integration policies. Creating “good
governance indicators” rather than “attempting to measure the ‘degree of integration’ of individuals or
immigrant groups, which remains a challenge” is the way to achieve this.34 Finally, Annex 1 of the
handbook, entitled “Praxis-based Policies – the Translation of Practices into Policies”, presents the
29 J. Niessen and Y. Schibel, Handbook on Integration for Policy-makers and Practitioners, Second Edition, DG
Justice, Freedom and Security, European Commission, Brussels, May 2007.
30 The book’s drafting took place following a similar methodology as the 2004 edition. Here also, the MPG, in
cooperation with the NCPI, prepared the document following the outcomes of technical seminars, which dealt
with mainstreaming integration (Chapter 1), housing (Chapter 2), economic integration (Chapter 3) and integra-
tion governance (Chapter 4). It is interesting to see how it addressed the authorship: “National Contact Points on
Integration and MPG are seen as the editors, preparing a conceptual framework for the seminars, taking stock of
the information gathered at each seminar, selecting practices, and supplementing them with additional research”
(emphasis added).
31 It argues that “[t]he question might be expected to trigger familiar debates about assimilation or multicultural-
ism, but participants at the technical seminars preparing the handbook hardly used these terms”.
32 See J. Niessen and Y. Schibel (2007).
33 It states that objectives should be SMART, which the handbook defines as specific, measurable, accepted,
realistic and time-dependent. See also European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC(2005) 791,
15 June 2005, pp. 20-22.
34 See p. 77 of J. Niessen and Y. Schibel (2007).
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following policy recommendations:35 first, measuring the quality of integration projects and programs
by studying their relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact; and second, apprais-
ing projects and programs by comparing them with each other, identifying actors, formulating policy
options and assessing their impact (“exchanging and learning from good practices” – see Annex 6 of
this study). A third edition of the handbook is planned for publication in 2009.
1.2.2 The CBPs, the European Commission and the EIF
The policy processes of exchanging information on integration, identifying best practices and
delivering content for the handbooks on integration have introduced several innovative fea-
tures to the classical configurations characterizing the European approach(es) to integration.
Recent policy documents on the CBPs published by the DG JFS and the EIF contain these.
1.2.2.1 The CBPs
The European Council adopted The Hague Program on 4–5 November 2004, which provides a new
legislative policy roadmap in the AFSJ for the period 2005-2010.36 The Program describes integration
as a highly relevant policy area.37 The 19 November 2004 JHA Council Conclusions adopted the
CBPs.38 First, these principles assist member states in formulating integration policies. The CBPs are
a simple, non-binding guide through which member states can assess their policies. They serve as a
basis for the EU to develop existing EU instruments on integration. Second, they serve as a basis for
increased interaction among the EU, national, regional and local authorities, so that they may develop
and implement integration policies. Third, the CBPs assist the Council in creating EU-level mecha-
nisms and policies that support national and local integration policy efforts, particularly through EU-
wide learning and knowledge-sharing. The 11 CBPs are the following:
1. Integration is a “dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation” by all immigrants and resi-
dents of the member states.
2. Integration implies respect for “the basic values of the EU”. This principle involves the obligation
that “every resident in the EU” needs to adapt and adhere closely to the basic values of the Union
35 Ibid., pp. 89–91.
36 T. Balzacq and S. Carrera, “The Hague Program: The Long Road to Freedom, Security and Justice”, in T.
Balzacq and S. Carrera (eds), Security versus Freedom: A Challenge for Europe’s Future, Aldershot: Ashgate
Publishing, 2006, pp. 1–34; see also T. Balzacq and S. Carrera, Migration, Borders and Asylum: Trends and
Vulnerabilities in EU Policy, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, July, 2005; and also A. Baldaccini, E.
Guild and H. Toner (eds), Whose Freedom, Security and Justice? EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy,
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007.
37 Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 4 and 5 November 2004, 14292/1/04, Brussels, 8 De-
cember 2004, OJ C53/1, 3.3.2005; see also S. Bertozzi (2007), Integration: An Ever Closer-Challenge, CEPS
Working Document No. 258, February 2007, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.
38 See “Common Basic Principles on Immigrants Integration” in Council of the European Union, 2618th Meeting
of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, 14615/04, Brussels, 19 November 2004.
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and the laws of the member states. Also the member states have to ensure that all residents “un-
derstand, respect, benefit from, and are protected on an equal basis by the full scope of values,
rights, responsibilities, and privileges established by the EU and Member State laws”.
3. Employment is a key part of the integration process and participation of immigrants.
4. 1) Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions is indispensable for
integration; 2) enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential for successful in-
tegration.
5. Efforts in education are crucial for preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be
more successful and more active participants in society.
6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a
basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is critical.
7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and EU citizens is a fundamental mechanism for inte-
gration. Shared fora, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrants’ culture,
and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immi-
grants and member state citizens.
8. 1) The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental
Rights and must be safeguarded, 2) unless such practices conflict with other inviolable European
rights or national law.
9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration
policies and measures, especially at the local level, support their integration.
10. Integration is to be mainstreamed in all relevant portfolios and levels of government and public
services.
11. Clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are to be developed to adjust policy, evaluate
progress on integration and make the exchange of information more effective. 39
The Annex of the 2004 JHA Council Conclusions specifies that
[t]he purpose of such evaluation is to learn from experience, [as] a way to avoid possible
failures of the past, adjust policy accordingly and [of] showing interest for each others ef-
forts. When Member States share information about their evaluative tools at European level
and, where appropriate, develop European criteria (indicators, benchmarks) and gauges for
the purposes of comparative learning, the process of knowledge-sharing will be made more
39 Ibid.
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effective…Exchanging information provides for taking into account the different phases in
which Member States find themselves in the development of their own integration policies
and strategies. 40 (emphasis added)
CBPs 2 (respect of the basic values of the EU) and 4.1 (basic knowledge of the host society’s lan-
guage, history and institutions is indispensable for integration) alter how integration is conceived in the
EU framework on integration. They are difficult to reconcile with the two-way process principle (CBP
1).
1.2.2.2 The European Commission
Among the various policy measures adopted by the European Commission since 2003 in the EU
framework on integration there have been three Communications that should be highlighted: the
Communication on a Common Agenda for Integration – Framework for the Integration of Third Coun-
try Nationals in the European Union (COM(2005) 389), the Communication on the Third Annual
Report on Migration and Integration (COM(2007) 512) and the Communication on a Common Immi-
gration Policy for Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools (COM(2008) 359). 
The Communication on a Common Agenda for Integration (COM(2005) 389) of 1 September 2005
put forward concrete measures for strengthening the implementation of the CBPs.41 It also identified a
series of “suggested actions or a road map” to help implement the CBPs at the national and European
levels. The Commission clarified that the package of actions was only “indicative and not exhaustive”.
Member states were “to set priorities and select the actions”. Yet those of the common agenda for
integration should be considered the “main elements of all national and EU integration policies”. Fur-
thermore, these actions built on the handbook on integration and financial Community instruments that
focused on the integration of TCNs. The following three proposed actions are particularly significant.
First, concerning CBP 2, “Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union”, the
Commission called for “[e]mphasising civic orientation in introduction programs and other activities for
newly arrived third-country nationals with the view of ensuring that immigrants understand, respect
and benefit from common European and national values”42 (emphasis added).
Second, regarding CBP 4.1, (basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions
is indispensable to integration), it suggested orientation programs for newcomers, as well as pre-
departure information and courses to acquire “previous knowledge of the country”. The Communica-
tion called for
40 Ibid.
41 European Commission, Communication on a Common Agenda for Integration – Framework for the Integration
of Third Country Nationals in the European Union, COM(2005) 389, Brussels, 1 September 2005; see also C.
Collet, One Size fits All? Tailored Integration Policies for Migrants in the European Union, EPC Working Paper
No. 24, European Policy Centre, Brussels, 2006.
42 See the European Commission’s (2005) Communication COM(2005) 389, op. cit.
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[s]trengthening the integration component of admission procedures, e.g. through predepar-
ture measures such as information packages and language and civic orientation courses in
the country of origin…[o]rganising introduction programs and activities for newly arrived
third-country nationals to acquire basic knowledge about language, history, institutions, so-
cioeconomic features, cultural life and fundamental values.43 (emphasis added)
Third, it also called for a coherent EU-level approach. “Cooperation activities, exchange of information,
mainstreaming and evaluation” through the implementation of CBPs 10 and 11 should be the basis of
this coherent approach.44 The Communication on a Common Agenda for Integration refers to CBP 11
and the necessity for governments to first, increasingly monitor and assess national policies; second,
make better use of statistical data in devising integration policy; and third, evaluate policy and improve
their understanding of what effects compulsory integration programs have.
The JHA Council Conclusions on Strengthening Integration Policies in the European Union by promot-
ing Unity in Diversity of 12–13 June 200745 invited the NCPI and the European Commission to explore
expanding the ‘European approach’ to integration by promoting the development of common indica-
tors and indices for member states to use “on a voluntary basis” to assess their own policies. The
Third Annual Report on Migration and Integration (COM(2007) 512) was published on 11 Septem-
ber 2007.46 With it, the Commission assessed the development of a common immigration policy and
mapped EU-wide migration data.47 The report offers an overview of perceived migration trends in the
EU, as well as current migration and integration policy at the national and EU levels. It places recent
integration policies in relation to the CBPs on integration. It states that “[m]ost concepts present in
Member States’ integration policies are codified by the Common Basic Principles and they are, to dif-
ferent extents, reflected in their integration strategies”.48 The summary report on integration policies in
the EU-27 determined that the CBPs have had an impact on integration policies in some member
states. It also confirmed the spread of mandatory integration programs as a trend in the EU.49
43 The Annex states that as “managed migration schemes are established, and within the context of developing
a European approach to the admission of labour migrants, there is scope for paying more attention to pre-
departure measures which can improve the integration process on arrival. Such measures can be part of com-
prehensive migration and development strategies.”
44 See the European Commission’s (2005) Communication COM(2005) 389, op. cit.
45 Council of the European Union, 2807th Meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, Press Release,
10267/07, Luxembourg, 12-13 June 2007.
46 European Commission, Communication on the Third Annual Report on Migration and Integration, COM(2007)
512, Brussels, 11 September 2007.
47 See also the two previous versions: European Commission, Communication on the First Annual Report on
Migration and Integration, COM(2004) 508, Brussels, 16 June 2004, and European Commission, Second Annual
Report on Migration and Integration, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2006) 892, Brussels, 30 June
2006.
48 See the European Commission’s (2007) Communication COM(2007) 512, op. cit.
49 Page 13 states that “[i]ntroduction programs are established in most Member States and they are compulsory
in some countries, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands”.
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Further developing the Common Agenda, the Commission has introduced the concept of European
modules for migrant integration (EMMI). These would be “based on existing good practice to develop
guidelines on various aspects of the integration process (introductory courses, promoting participation
of immigrants and other citizens in local life, etc.)”.50 The modules would include introductory courses
and provide common standards for integration courses. They would use “the experience gathered in
the drafting of the Handbook on Integration”.51 The EMMI system would include common indicators
and indices to evaluate integration programs and “to provide benchmarks for comparative analysis”.52
The Commission is planning to publish another Communication on integration by October 2008, which
will include benchmarking.
The Communication on a Common Immigration Policy in Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools
(COM(2008) 359) of 17 June 2008 contains the European Commission’s new political vision for devel-
oping a common EU immigration policy.53 The Communication identifies 10 principles upon which the
common immigration policy should be based. It groups these under three main headings: prosperity,
security and solidarity. It places integration under the heading of “Prosperity: The Contribution of Legal
Migration to the Socio-Economic Development of the EU”, and more particularly in subsection 3 enti-
tled “Prosperity and Immigration: Integration is the Key to Successful Immigration”. One of the 10
common principles (the third one) reads as follows:
The integration of legal immigrants should be improved by strengthened efforts from host
Member States and contributions from immigrants themselves (“two-way process”), in accor-
dance with the Common Basic Principles on Integration adopted in 2004. Immigrants should
be provided with opportunities to participate and develop their full potential. European societies
should enhance their capacity to manage immigration-related diversity and enhance social co-
hesion.54 (emphasis added)
Among the set of concrete actions that the Communication proposes, the following are particularly
significant. First, the ‘mainstreaming approach’ of the EU framework on integration should be
strengthened. This would be done mainly within the European Commission in order to ‘globally’ cover
elements related to civic participation, social inclusion, anti-discrimination, equal opportunities, access
to employment, education, intercultural dialogue, etc. Second, action is to be taken to develop “mutual
learning and exchange of best practices to strengthen the ability of host countries to manage their
increasing diversity” along with “common indicators and adequate statistical capacity…to evaluate
integration policy outcomes”. 55 Third, action is proposed “to support integration programs for newly
arrived immigrants” and emphasize the
50 See the European Commission’s (2007) Communication COM(2007) 512, op. cit.
51 The modules would be developed by ‘experts’, under the guidance of the NCPI. See F. Frattini, “A Common
Approach for European Policy on the Integration of Migrants – European Debate”, Speech/07/295, Informal
Meeting of EU Integration Ministers, Potsdam, 10 May 2006.
52 The report concluded by making reference to how the European Commission “will present a new concept [for
the Annual Report] to provide a more comprehensive information and monitoring tool”.
53 European Commission, Communication on a Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, Actions and
Tools, COM(2008) 359 final, Brussels, 17 June 2008.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
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[p]ractical intercultural skills needed for effective adaptation as well as the commitment to fun-
damental European values; this could be further explored by identifying the basic rights and
obligations for newly arrived immigrants, in the framework of specific national procedures (e.g.
integration curricula, explicit integration commitments, welcoming programs, national plans for
citizenship and integration, civic introduction or orientation courses). 56 (emphasis added)
Finally, the Communication called on the European Council to adopt the set of principles as the basis
upon which the common immigration policy could be taken forward. The Commission proposed that
this process occur through “coordinated and coherent action” by the EU and its member states. These
should set up a “common methodology” to transform the principles into common objectives and indica-
tors and ensure their implementation. The European Commission would evaluate these in the member
states as part of the Commission’s annual report on migration and integration.57 Each Spring Euro-
pean Council would monitor member states’ implementation of concrete actions. This would entail a
“political assessment of the situation at European and national levels”58 and put forward recommenda-
tions. The Communication can be seen as a re-launching of the 2001 Commission initiative to
establish the OMC on immigration in the EU (see Section 2.1 below).
1.2.2.3 The EIF
In April 2005, the Commission presented a Communication on the first Framework Program on Soli-
darity and Management of Migration Flows for 2007-2013.59 This Communication proposed funding
integration programs in the EU with €1.7 billion. After the Council’s amendments and the European
Parliament’s Opinion, the European Fund for the Integration of TCNs was formally adopted on June
2007 (Council Decision 2007/435/EC). The financial commitment made was €825 million.60 The EIF
devolves €768 million to member states for national programs through a distribution key, which con-
siders the number of legally resident TCNs in each member state. The EIF foresees €57 million for
Community actions. The UK and Ireland took part in adopting the EIF.61
56 Ibid.
57 According to p. 15 of the Communication, “[t]he agreed common objectives and indicators will be factored into
national immigration profiles…These profiles will ascertain the national labor market situation and immigration
patterns and help to strengthen the evidence base for immigration policies that effectively address the priority
needs of the Member States. They will bring together all relevant information needed and their scope will cover
both immigrants already in their territory and potential immigrants. These profiles will look at the skills composi-
tion of the immigration population and identify future labor needs.”
58 See the European Commission’s (2008) Communication COM(2008) 359 final, op. cit.
59 European Commission, Proposal for a Decision establishing the European Integration Fund for the period
2007-2013 as a part of the General Program “Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows”, COM(2005) 123
final, Brussels, 6 April 2005.
60 Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2007/435/EC of 27 June 2007 establishing the European
Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals for the Period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General Program
“Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows”, OJ L 168/18, 28.6.2007.
61 M.A. Kate and J. Niessen, Locating Immigrant Integration Policy Measures in the Machinery of the European
Commission, Migration Policy Group, Brussels, 2007.
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The objective of the EIF is to enhance member states’ national efforts to enable TCNs “to fulfill
the conditions of residence and to facilitate their integration into European societies, in accordance
with the CBPs”.62 Article 2.2 of the EIF emphasizes that it should promote national integration strate-
gies for TCNs taking into account the two-way process principle. The specific objectives of the fund
are first, to facilitate the development and implementation of admission procedures supportive of inte-
gration. Second, the fund seeks to develop the integration of newly-arrived TCNs in the member
states. The third objective is to increase member states’ capacity to develop, implement, monitor and
evaluate policies and programs for the integration of TCNs, and the fourth goal is to exchange infor-
mation, best practices and enhance cooperation among member states.
The EIF primarily co-finances concrete programs that support the integration of “newly-arrived
third country nationals”.63 Non-nationals who are in a third country and who are complying with “pre-
departure measures and/or conditions set out in national law, including those relating to the ability to
integrate in the society of this member state fall under the scope of this Decision”.64 Article 19 states
that the criteria for allocating financial resources to the member states should take into consideration
the total number of TCNs legally staying in their territory and the total number of immigrants newly
admitted over a given period. Article 12 says that €500,000 will be allocated each year from the EIF.65
The European Commission has developed strategic guidelines and set up a framework for interven-
tion in integration policy. The Commission will promote the CBPs and develop “a common approach to
the integration of third-country nationals in the EU”.66 The Commission’s Decision on setting up the
specific priorities that will be covered by the EIF between 2007 and 2013 includes “the devel-
opment of indicators and evaluation methodologies to assess progress, adjust policies and
measures and to facilitate co-ordination of comparative learning”, as well as the development
“of common models and standards at EU level”.67 Possible actions that member states could initi-
62 See Recital 10 of the Preamble and Article 2.1 of the Decision.
63 The Decision states in recital 13 of the Preamble that “[r]eference could be made in this context to Council
Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term
residents”. The following categories are excluded: seasonal workers, those admitted for the purposes of studies,
pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service, and those admitted for scientific research, those
who have received a renewal of an authorization issued by a member state or a change of status, including
those falling within the scope of the Council Directive 2003/109/EC.
64 See Article 1.2.
65 The remainder of the available annual resources will be broken down among the member states as follows:
40% in relation to the average of the total number of legally residing third-country nationals over the previous
three years, and 60% in proportion to the number of immigrants with authorization to reside on its territory over
the previous three years.
66 European Commission, Decision Implementing Council Decision 2007/435/EC as regards the adoption of
strategic guidelines for 2007/2013, 21 August 2007.
67 The Decision elaborates this strategic guideline as Priority 2, in the following manner: “The integration of third-
country nationals is a dynamic area of expertise and practice. Its evolving character is a crucial element which
can enhance success in this area. One of the main success factors is constant measuring and monitoring of
policies and activities so that they bring the results which are intended. Development of clearly-defined objec-
tives and assessment instruments is of the utmost importance in order to be more effective. Such instruments
should be encouraged at all levels of integration governance, i.e. national, regional, local and European. They
are also important for the development of common models and standards at EU level.”
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ate along these lines are supporting research on integration indicators and benchmarking, and devel-
oping monitoring tools and evaluation methods. Such tools could also be developed to assess
immigrant orientation programs. On the basis of the Commission’s strategic guidelines, the member
states must present draft multi-annual programs. Member states will transpose these through annual
programs,68 which will need to be approved by the Commission. In preparing their draft multi-annual
programs, member states should include at least three integration priorities identified by the Commis-
sion. Actions designed to put the CBPs into practice (priority 1) and develop indicators and
evaluation mechanisms (priority 2) are mandatory.69 The European Commission published the first
call for project proposals in December 2007.70
1.2.3 Key Actors in the EU Framework on Integration
The EU framework on integration has created a multilevel system of integration governance. It
substantially impacts the interaction of European institutional actors and influences their respective
status and roles as determined by the Community method and the Treaties. As Hatzopoulos (2007)
has pointed out, the consequence of this institutional resettlement is that the traditional role of Euro-
pean institutions has been altered, as equally have been the premises of the EU.71 As regards the
institutional dimension of the EU framework on integration, the Council and the European Commission
remain the key players. The Commission (DG JFS) has promoted the development of the policy
framework while reassuring the Council about its role. As discussed in Chapter Three, the Commis-
sion has funded research projects on benchmarking integration, mainly through the program on
Preparatory Actions for Integration of TCNs (INTI), which was replaced in 2007 by the EIF.72 The in-
volvement of the European Parliament in integration policy has been weak. This has been the case for
instance in the adoption of the CBPs, which were only adopted by the Council and government repre-
sentatives of the member states. The position of the European Parliament has been ad hoc and has
68 Article 19 states that “2. The Commission shall provide the Member States, by 1 July of each year, with an
estimate of the amounts to be allocated to them for the following year from the total appropriations allocated
under the annual budgetary procedure, calculated as provided by Article 12. 3. Member States shall submit to
the Commission, by 1 November of each year, a draft annual program for the following year.” Article 20 provides
for the Mid-Term Review of the Multi-annual Program.
69 Other priorities include priority 3, “Policy capacity building, co-ordination and intercultural competence building
in the Member States across the different levels and departments of government”; and priority 4, “Exchange of
experience, good practice and information on integration between the Member States”. See pp. 4–5 of the An-
nex of the Decision implementing Decision 2007/435/EC.
70 European Commission, “Integrating Third Country Nationals: The Commission launches the 2007 Call for
Proposals under the New Community Actions of the European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nation-
als”, Press Release IP/07/1882, Brussels, 10 December 2007. A total of €4,503 million was allocated for the 
Community actions during 2007.
71 V. Hatzopoulos, “Why the Open Method of Coordination is Bad for You: A Letter to the EU”, European Law
Journal, Vol. 13, No. 3, May 2007, pp. 309–42.
72 In 2005, a total of 15 research projects were funded by the DG FSJ through INTI, 14 of which dealt with
“[s]upporting of networks and exchange of information and best practices” and received a total of €4,276,345. In 
2006, a total 12 projects were funded and received a total of €3,894,220. See European Commission, INTI Re-
port: Integration of Third-Country Nationals, 2003-2004 Projects, DG Justice, Freedom and Security, Brussels,
June 2006.
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lacked impetus.73 Meanwhile, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) has become a
very active player in making conceptual progress on defining integration and creating policy tools
within the EU framework on integration.74
The institutional landscape of the EU framework on integration can only be understood by considering
the networks that have been or are in the process of being developed. The NCPI network (made up
of representatives from member state ministries in charge of the integration of TCNs) has become a
very influential forum. Its members influence the formulation of current integration policy priorities. By
way of illustration, they provided content for the three annual reports on migration and integration pub-
lished by the Commission, as well as for the handbooks on integration. The exchanges between the
NCPI and the Council are increasingly considered “necessary and in need of promotion”.75 The NCPI
members appear to have a degree of independence from their fellow government representatives,
who participate in the Council working groups.
The NCPI network has established itself as a forum with great potential. It currently bridges European
institutions and member states (national, regional and local levels of government). It works closely with
the European Commission and civil society organizations (such as the MPG). The nature of this net-
work makes its effects difficult to measure. Its governance is non-linear (sometimes bottom-up, while
top-down at others), but it supports a rapidly evolving web of competing strategies at multiple levels of
government. The NCPI network has provided a supranational platform, identifying certain inte-
gration policies, programs and practices at the national level as ‘the best’ and disseminating
these across the EU.
The European Commission has placed clear priority on involving a wide range of stakeholders in de-
veloping the EU framework on integration. The Communication on a Common Agenda for Integration
(COM(2005) 389)76 calls for a European integration forum to be established. The forum should bring
together at the EU level the main stakeholders active in the area of integration. The EESC was for-
mally asked by the European Commission to submit an Opinion concerning the establishment of the
73 H. Ceri Jones, C. Pineda, F. Pissart and T. Timmermans, Beyond the Common Basic Principles on Integra-
tion: The Next Steps, European Policy Centre, Brussels, 2005. It needs to be underlined, however, that the JHA
Council Meeting of June 2007 did acknowledge the European Parliament’s Report on Strategies and Means for
the Integration of Immigrants in the European Union, 2006/2056/INI, A6-0190/2006, Committee on Civil Liber-
ties, Justice and Home Affairs, Rapporteur: Stavros Lambrinidis, 17 May 2006.
74 EESC, Immigration: The Role of Civil Society in Integration, Foreword by Franco Frattini, Luxembourg: Office
for the Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007. For more information see the website of the
SOC Section of the EESC (http://www.eesc.europa.eu/sections/soc/index_en.asp?id=1001socen).
75 See para. 11 of the JHA Council Conclusions of 12–13 June 2007, which provided that “[t]he Council invites
incoming Presidencies and the Commission to proactively develop the Common Agenda for Integration and to
promote the principles set out in paragraph 1. The Commission is further invited to report in particular to the
[2008] Ministerial Conference on Integration on the results of the tasks assigned to the NCPI network, as de-
scribed in point 9 of these Conclusions. This report should be the starting point for discussion on future priorities”
(see footnote 45 above).
76 European Commission, Communication on a Common Agenda for Integration – Framework for the Integration
of Third Country Nationals in the European Union, COM(2005) 389, Brussels, 1 September 2005.
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forum, which was adopted on 9 July 2008.77 The forum will include a maximum of 100 members and
meet twice a year. One-third of the forum’s members will come from EU umbrella organizations work-
ing in the area of integration and on social issues. The remaining members will come from consultative
bodies of the member states (with each member state sending between one and four representa-
tives).78 As regards its functions, the EESC has proposed that the forum would have the authority to
elaborate official opinions, recommendations and reports concerning integration policies at the EU
level. The forum could make proposals and recommendations. It has also been proposed that it could
contribute to the conferences that feed into the handbooks on integration and at times contribute to
NCPI meetings. The CBPs will act as a roadmap for its activities and agenda. The forum will also have
the capacity to “assess the objectives and programs of the EIF, as well as the other instruments pro-
vided for under European integration policy”. The Opinion also stipulates that “[e]xchanging technical
know-how and good practice should be one of the forum's main tasks, to be carried out in cooperation
with the network of National Contact Points” (emphasis added).
Finally, the group of “integration actors and stakeholders” would not be complete without the Euro-
pean networks of local and regional authorities. On 5 November 2007 the European Commission
together with Eurocities79 signed the Milan Declaration.80 The Declaration recognized the key role of
cities in integration policies and the need to strengthen their voices in shaping the EU’s agenda on
integration. It also launched the so-called ‘integrating cities process’ as a platform for fostering the
dialogue between cities on the CBPs at the local level. The process consists of an annual event and a
research project (INTI Cities, “Benchmarking Local Integration Governance”) as discussed in Chapter
3.5 below.81
77 EESC, Elements for the Structure, Organization and Functioning of a Platform for the Greater involvement of
Civil Society in the EU-level promotion of policies for the integration of third country nationals, Opinion, SOC/281,
Brussels, 9 July 2008.
78 Para. 3.6.5 of the Opinion clarifies that “[i]n this way, the forums, platforms, councils and similar institutions
that exist in the Member States – especially those involving immigrant organisations – will also be represented in
the European Forum. In those Member States where no such organisations exist, the economic and social
councils (or similar institutions) could have a place in the Forum.” It continues by stating in para. 3.6.6 that “im-
migrants' organisations, most of which are organised on national lines and do not have European networks,
must be encouraged to become involved in the European Integration Forum; the Member State forums, plat-
forms, councils or ESCs should, therefore, nominate delegates from the most representative immigrants'
organisations”.
79 Eurocities is a network of major European cities. Founded in 1986, the network brings together the local gov-
ernments of more than 130 large cities in over 30 European countries (www.eurocities.org).
80 The Milan Declaration, “Integrating Cities”, was signed by the former Vice President of the European Commis-
sion and Commissioner responsible for Freedom, Security and Justice, Franco Frattini, and Letizia Moratti and
Ivo Opstelten – the Mayors of Milan and Rotterdam respectively. The Declaration can be retrieved from the INTI
Cities website (www.inticities.eu/upl/1/default/doc/47.pdf). See also the announcement in the Eurocities Flash,
No. 72, November 2007, p. 3. The first “Integrating Cities (European Policies, Local Practices)” Conference took
place in Rotterdam on 8–10 October 2006 (http://www.integratingcities.nl/introduction.php). Refer also to the
website of the second “Integrating Cities” Conference in Milan, which took place on 5–6 November 2007
(http://www.integratingcities.it/index.html).
81 There are other umbrella organizations of local authorities, such as ERLAI, a Brussels-based network of re-
gional and local officers on asylum and immigration, who are also active players in the debate on benchmarking
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2 The Growing Interest in Benchmarking Integration as a Policy
Tool in the EU
The method of benchmarking needs to be understood within the context of the OMC. The OMC
constitutes a way of cooperating at the EU level that falls outside the classical configurations of the
Community method, which uses coordination, exchange of information and benchmarks/indicators as
the main tactics and tools for fostering Europeanization. In this Chapter, we first address the relation-
ship between the OMC and the area of immigration. Then we evaluate the extent to which the EU
framework on integration can be considered a ‘quasi-OMC’.
2.1 The OMC and Immigration
The literature on the origins of the OMC and its current application to different EU policies is exten-
sive.82 It is worth recalling that while a version of this method had already been applied since the mid-
1990s in the scope of the European monetary union, the actual term ‘open method of coordination’
only made its first appearance in the Lisbon Presidency Conclusions of 23–24 March 2000. The Lis-
bon strategy identified a new strategic goal for the Union: to achieve “greater social cohesion”. This
strategy would specifically aim at modernizing “the European social model, investing in people and
combating social exclusion”, and its implementation would be facilitated by the application of a new
OMC “as the means of spreading best practice and achieving greater convergence towards the main
EU goals”.83 The new method would involve the following elements:
1. fixing guidelines (common objectives) for the Union combined with specific timetables for achiev-
ing the goals with the member states set in the short, medium and long terms;
2. establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks (common
indicators) against “the best in the world”, tailored to the needs of different member states and
sectors as a means of comparing “best practice”; 
3. translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets
and adopting measures, taking into account their differences; the translation of the common ob-
integration in the EU. For more information see the website (www.emiliaromagnasociale.it/
wcm/emiliaromagnasociale/home/immigrazione/Erlai/Presentation.htm).
82 For a ‘state of the art’ perspective, see V. Hatzopoulos, “Why the Open Method of Coordination is Bad for You:
A Letter to the EU”, European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 3, May 2007, pp. 309–42.
83 European Council (2000), Presidency Conclusions of the Extraordinary Lisbon European Council of 23–24
March, SN100/1/00, Brussels.
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jectives into national policy plans provided by the member states to the European Commission in
the form of National Action Plans (NAPs); and
4. periodic monitoring and peer review by the Council and the Commission on the performance of
the member states organised as “mutual learning processes”.84
Since then, the OMC has been used in various EU policies,85 for example in the areas of employment,
social inclusion, pensions and health.86 In the framework of the OMC, benchmarking has been defined
by de la Porte (2002) as
[e]valuating performance on the basis of a benchmark, which can be conceived as a yard-
stick against which reality can be measured diachronically and comparatively. In the
framework of the OMC, it is the means by which to assess the success of the application of
the method, and to put pressure on the EU Member States participating in the process to
converge towards commonly defined goals. It consists of defining standards or reference
points with respect to different aspects, objectives and effects of certain work methods,
measures, or policies.
The application of the OMC to immigration and integration was first proposed by the European Com-
mission in the Communication on an Open Method of Coordination for the Community Immigration
Policy (COM(2001) 387) of July 2001.87 The Commission recognized that the development of a com-
mon immigration policy required the adoption of a “coordinating method” following the one already
applied in the context of employment.88 In the view of the Commission, “while the Member States re-
main responsible for a number of significant issues with respect to the admission of economic
migrants and for developing and implementing integration policy”,89 the OMC would be complementary
to the enactment of the ordinary legislative framework. Its implementation would be the most appropri-
84 Ibid.
85 For a study of the various areas where it currently applies see E. Szysczak, “Experimental Governance: The
Open Method of Coordination”, European Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2006, pp. 486–94.
86 See for instance M. López Santana, “The Domestic Implication of European Soft-Law: Framing and Transmit-
ting Change in Employment Policy”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 4, June 2006, pp. 481–99; J.
Zeitlin and P. Pochet (eds), The Open Method of Coordination Action: The European Employment and Social
Inclusion Strategies, Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang, 2005; R. Dehousse, L’Europe sans Bruxelles? Une analyse de la
Methode Ouverte de Coordination, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004; C. De la Porte, “Is the Open Method of Coordina-
tion Appropriate for Organising Activities at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?”, European Law Journal,
Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2002, pp. 38–58.
87 European Commission, Communication on an Open Method of Coordination for the Community Immigration
Policy, COM(2001) 387, Brussels, 11 June 2001.
88 See J. Niessen, “Consultations on Immigration Policies”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 4, No.
1, 2002, pp. 79-83, and also by the same author, The Management and Managers of Immigration, Migration
Policy Group, Brussels, 2000, in which a clear proposal was made about the applicability of the cooperation
under ‘the Luxembourg Process’ to immigration policy. The proposal included the annual adoption of guidelines
for the Member States’ employment policies, recommendations for their implementation in the national arena,
the elaboration of national action plans for employment by the member states and the production of a joint em-
ployment report.
89 See p. 5 of the European Commission’s (2001) Communication COM(2001) 387, op. cit.
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ate way to stimulate the gradual development of common responses through coordination and ex-
perimentation of national policies. Furthermore, the Commission would support the OMC by putting
forward initiatives for “European guidelines, ensuring coordination of national policies, exchange of
best practice and evaluation of the impact of the Community policy”.90 The OMC would also foster dis-
cussion on migration-related issues with the aim of promoting the “progressive convergence” of
national policies and practices, and in the long term the establishment of common standards and har-
monized objectives.
How would the OMC work in practice?91 Under the proposed system, the Council would produce
“Multi-annual Guidelines for the Union” that would be accompanied by specific timetables for the
achievement of a set of common goals. The member states would implement these guidelines in “Na-
tional Action Plans”,92 which would be subject to an evaluation (peer review) and adaptation on an
annual basis. The European Commission would prepare “Synthesis Reports” on common problems
and concerns, and would also identify those fields where common “European solutions” are needed.
This would then facilitate Community legislation. The Commission would play a central role in the
OMC. In addition to putting forward proposals on the bases of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere
Program, and monitoring their implementation to ensure consistency, it would also prepare initiatives
for European guidelines. It would promote cooperation, the exchange of information and best prac-
tices, and evaluation and monitoring.93 These steps would be accompanied by wide consultations, and
the Commission could even set up “committees and working groups”, with senior officials, experts,
social partners, local and regional authorities, etc.
One of the fields identified by the European Commission for the application of the OMC was “the inte-
gration of third country nationals”.94 While the Communication (COM(2001) 387) was never taken
forward by the Council, the area of integration has been subject to a non-formalized or quasi-OMC in
the context of the EU framework on integration.
90 Ibid., p. 6.
91 S. Velluti, “What European Strategy for Integrating Migrants? The Role of the OMC Soft Mechanisms in the
Development of an EU Immigration Policy”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2007, pp. 53–
82; see also A. Caviedes, “The Open Method of Coordination in Immigration Policy: A Tool for Prying Open For-
tress Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 11, No. 2, April 2004, pp. 289–310; and also B. Bogusz,
“Modes of Governance for an EU Immigration Policy – What Role for the Open Method of Coordination”, in B.
Bogusz, R. Cholewinski, A. Cygan and E. Szyszczak (eds), Irregular Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical,
European and International Perspectives, Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2004, p. 224.
92 The NAPs would present two sections: a first section offering statistics on third-country nationals; information
on cooperation among different authorities, social partners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and mi-
grants’ organizations; information about the interaction of parallel legislative measures on migration, resources
used, “interesting experiences and good practices” and problems encountered; and information on the imple-
mentation of EC directives. The second section of the NAPs would provide the actions that they would like to
take at the national, local and regional levels for the implementation of the guidelines for the next phase. Refer to
Point 4.1 of the Communication, p. 12.
93 Refer to Point 4.2 of the Communication, under the heading “Developing and Evaluating the Community Im-
migration Policy”, pp. 13 and 14.
94 See Guideline No. 6, entitled “Ensuring the development of integration policies for third country nationals re-
siding legally on the territories of the Member States”.
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2.2 The OMC and Integration
The nature, methods and tools of the EU framework on integration fall within the category of
soft law, and their implementation shows a peculiar version of the OMC. The way in which the
EU framework operates involves a major transformation of, and to some extent a challenge to the
classical foundations substantiating the Community method of cooperation. It diversifies the usual
ways through which the EU legal system functions. The framework can be perceived as a new multi-
level setting of governance. It comprises a package of non-coercive regulatory tools and active
transnational networks. It is characterized by the interplay of strategies and politics exercised by the
Council, the European Commission, the member states and other European institutions, as well as
key stakeholders. These strategies and politics mutually influence and reinforce each other (top-down
and bottom-up). Yet they are driven by a complex web of heterogeneous premises and goals. The EU
framework on integration illustrates a way in which the OMC is being implemented at the EU level.
The similarities with the OMC become transparent when making a brief comparison between the two.
The framework complements EU legislative frameworks on immigration. It aims at influencing member
states’ national policies and programs on integration through informal discussions, the exchange of
information and transnational coordination. Furthermore, in the 2001 version of the OMC, the Council
was supposed to present “Multi-annual Guidelines for the Union”. The relationship between the CBPs
and the EIF may potentially have similar effects on the member states. Institutions that receive funding
from the latter will need to implement policies in compliance with the CBPs as stipulated in the Deci-
sion establishing the EIF (2007/435/EC). The Commission’s publication of the handbooks on
integration and annual reports, in cooperation with the NCPI, aims at synthesizing trends in national
and European policies. These works also act as a driver for the exchange of information and best
practices, and put forward policy recommendations. Finally, the Commission’s evaluation (benchmark-
ing and indexing) of integration practices makes the framework similar to the OMC.
Still, the EU framework on integration and the OMC are distinct in some ways. The framework does
not formally aim in the long term at any legislative harmonization.95 Also, the functions and powers
enjoyed by the Commission are more limited and blurred. This is the case concerning its role in ensur-
ing member states’ compliance with the CBPs. The Commission has proposed broad and rather
general actions for the member states to implement the CBPs. Under the OMC, the member states
would need to formally present NAPs, allowing the Commission and the Council to review their activi-
ties (and the identification of problems encountered and lessons learned/best practices).
95 This has been confirmed by the new Article 79.4 TFU of the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 79.4 states that “[t]he
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may estab-
lish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the
integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws
and regulations of the Member State”.
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3 State of the Art in Benchmarking Integration in the EU
This chapter examines the state of art in benchmarking integration in the EU. It looks at a selected
group of reports and projects conducted by civil society, academia and local authorities. The
analysis focuses on the rationale, the personal and territorial scope, the conceptual setting and the
methodology for benchmarking. This chapter provides the empirical data necessary to ascertain the
most important tensions and dilemmas characterizing the benchmarking technique in the field of inte-
gration in the EU.
3.1 The Study on Benchmarking Immigrant Integration
The Benchmarking Immigrant Integration study was conducted by the European Research Centre on
Migration and Ethnic Relations of the University of Rotterdam and was funded by the European Com-
mission (DG JFS) in 2002.96 The rationale of the study was
[t]o explore some aspects of the concept of integration and to assess how these aspects
can be measured in a way that enables comparisons between the Member States, groups
of immigrants and also over time...it can…contribute to a better monitoring of immigration
and integration processes and to greater effectiveness of policies in this field.97 (emphasis
added)
The study identifies three possible types of comparisons that could take place in benchmarking:
among TCNs, member states and across time. As regards the conceptual setting, it differentiates be-
tween the term “integration” (relating to the structural dimension/institutional participation, i.e. ways of
promoting immigrant participation in the major institutional arrangements of society such as the labor
market, education and health care systems), and that of “acculturation” (relating to the cultural dimen-
sion/cultural orientation and identification – the “phenomenon that immigrants gradually take over
certain major elements of their surrounding cultural environment”). Although a clear distinction is made
between these two terms, “for reasons of efficiency” the report later advises against distinguishing
between these two concepts and every time it refers to integration it also includes acculturation.98
96 H. Entzinger and R. Biezeveld, Benchmarking Immigrant Integration, Report written for the European Com-
mission, Contract No. DG Jai-A-2/2002/006, European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations,
Erasmus University of Rotterdam, 2003 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/
2004_2007/doc/study_indicators_integration.pdf); see also H. Entzinger and R. Biezeveld, “Benchmarking in
Immigrant Integration”, in R. Süssmuth and W. Weidenfeld (eds), Managing Integration: The European Union’s
Responsibilities towards Immigrants, Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2004, pp. 123–36.
97 See p. 5 of Entzinger and R. Biezeveld (2003).
98 Ibid., p. 11.
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From a methodological point of view, it is argued that while there is substantial diversity when compar-
ing member states’ approaches and policies on the integration of TCNs, they do present some
similarities and points of convergence allowing for comparison and therefore for benchmarking.99 It is
also mentioned that in a meeting with the NCPI the following core elements of integration were
agreed: “respect for fundamental values in a democratic society, and rights comparable with corre-
sponding obligations”.100 The study then differentiates among three major “dimensions of integration”,
which are socio-economic, legal–political and cultural, and attributes a number of indicators to each of
them as outlined below.
1) Socio-economic integration would include the following indicators: participation in the labor mar-
ket/employment, income level, representation in low-skill jobs, the average finding employment in
accordance with education, use of social security, levels of education and training, language skills,
quality of housing and residence patterns (segregation).
2) Legal–political integration would refer to issues such as the EU values of “granting equal rights to all
citizens and to third-country nationals residing in their territory”, and the concept of “civic citizenship”.
Civic citizenship would comprise “a common set of rights and obligations” that the TCNs would acquire
gradually over a period of legal residence without the need to be naturalized.101 Indicators within this
dimension include the numbers of TCNs naturalized or who obtain a secure residence status; the
number of those holding dual citizenship; participation in the political decision-making, politics and civil
society; family reunification; “and even more so, the right to marry someone from a third country”.102
3) Indicators forming part of the cultural dimension of integration would include for instance attitudes
toward basic rules and norms of the host country, frequency of social contacts, choice of spouse, lan-
guage skills and delinquency.
In addition to these three integration dimensions, the study gives importance to “the attitudes of recipi-
ent societies”, and refers to the two-way process principle (which has since become CBP 1), and
indicators such as reported cases of discrimination, perceptions of immigrants in the receiving society,
institutions that are sufficiently accessible to immigrants, an increase in awareness of diversity among
police, the incidence and effects of diversity policies and the role of the media. In this respect, the
study raises the following question: What exactly constitutes the core of society, its basic values and
rules? The study argues that “of certain values it can be said that they are shared by virtually everyone
in the European Union, such as the rule of law, respect for democracy, equality of men and women,
and the separation of church and state”. Then it refers to the tensions that exist between “two oppos-
99 J. Niessen, Diversity and Cohesion: New Challenge for the Integration of Immigrants and Minorities, Stras-
bourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2001.
100 See p. 18 of Entzinger and R. Biezeveld (2003).
101 The first time that this concept appeared in EU policy was in the Commission Communication on a Commu-
nity Immigration Policy, COM(2000) 757, 22 November 2000. It was later supported and promoted by the EESC
Opinion on Immigration, Integration and the Role of Civil Society, CES 365/2002, Brussels, 21 March 2002. For
an overview of the use of this concept see the table provided in Annex 2 of this paper.
102 See pp. 22 and 34 of Entzinger and R. Biezeveld (2003).
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ing ideologies” with regard to the cultural integration dimension, and “whether migrants are expected
to assimilate fully [in]to the host society or whether they may keep their own cultural identity”. It ac-
knowledges that there are major differences in integration approaches taken in the member states and
in “the desirability of certain degrees of acculturation”.
3.2 The European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index
The European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index (the 2005 index) was developed thanks to a part-
nership between the MPG, the British Council and the Foreign Policy Centre.103 What is the rationale
behind the 2005 index? According to the executive summary of the report, it intends
[t]o fill a knowledge gap on civic citizenship policies and inclusion at a European level. It is
important for Member States to think about issues of immigrant inclusion in a European
perspective, in order to keep up with the reality of EU-level policymaking, and the rapidly
emerging EU Common Space of Justice, Freedom and Security. This is the first attempt to
present the EU’s policies governing civic citizenship and inclusion in a concise and compa-
rable format.104 (emphasis added)
The goals are first, to present integration data (as of October 2004), comparing member states’ legis-
lative frameworks based on “EU averages”; and second, to enable monitoring and evaluation of how
member states implement “civic citizenship and inclusion agreed by all of them” in law and policy. A
third goal is to point out cases of best practice among member states. Finally, the index should allow
the comparison of these elements over time. The index maintains that civic citizenship should consti-
tute “the cornerstone” of “common standards of inclusive citizenship, which gradually extends the
responsibilities and entitlements of EU citizenship to all legally resident”. Moreover, it presents equality
and access as two of the key tenets that should guide European immigration and integration policies.
Following this understanding, TCNs should progressively become “active and full citizens”.105 The
concept of civic citizenship is then linked to that of “immigrant inclusion”. The latter is described as
encompassing labor market inclusion, family reunification, secure residence status (long-term resi-
dence), naturalization and anti-discrimination. The first edition of the index only addresses persons
who are “legally residing third-country nationals”,106 and evaluates legal provisions and policy. It does
103 A. Geddes and J. Niessen (with A. Balch, C. Bullen and M. J. Peiro), European Civic Citizenship and Inclu-
sion Index, British Council, Foreign Policy Centre and Migration Policy Group, Brussels, 2005.
104 Ibid.
105 The conceptual framing is more developed in J. Niessen, M.J. Peiro and Y. Schibel, Civic Citizenship and
Immigrant Inclusion – A Guide for the Implementation of Civic Citizenship Policies, Migration Policy Group, Brus-
sels, 2005.
106 The following groups are not included: asylum-seekers and refugees, and “ethnic minorities who hold EU
citizenship. For example, immigrants who have naturalised or subsequent generations of migrants who are given
EU citizenship at birth are not covered in the Index.” See p. 9 of Geddes and Niessen (2005).
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not address the outcomes of these laws and policies in terms of their effectiveness in practice.107 Fur-
thermore, it does not assess “cultural integration” or political participation. It instead evaluates policies
and laws regarding civic citizenship and the labor market in the EU-15.
How should one understand and read the index? The member states’ policies and regulations108 are
measured based on a normative framework created by the MPG. Points are awarded in accordance
with how easily national laws allow TCNs to access 1) the labor market, 2) family reunification, 3) long-
term resident status, 4) naturalization, and 5) anti-discrimination protections. The index deems these
five areas as key for fostering “migrant inclusion”. For each of these five areas, the index assesses
four dimensions “of the statuses and protections that immigrants enjoy”: dimension 1, eligibil-
ity/scope;109 dimension 2, conditions for acquisition/remedies;110 dimension 3, security of
status/equality agencies/integration measures;111 and dimension 4, rights associated/proactive poli-
cies.112
The index is based on a common/practical normative framework that the MPG established. The index
assesses and quantifies “the policy conditions [that] are more favourable to immigrant inclusion”, and
which the authors consider “the best direction” for fostering civic citizenship and immigrant inclusion.
The common framework compares national policy frameworks with EU legislation, international con-
ventions and NGO proposals on immigration and integration. In particular, the following instruments
form the base of the index: the Council Directives 2003/109 on the status of third-country nationals
who are long-term residents and 2003/86 on the right to family reunification, the Council Directives
2000/78 and 2000/43 on non-discrimination,113 the Council of Europe Convention on Nationality
(1997), the MPG and ILPA’s Amsterdam proposals and the Starting Line Group.114 The index makes a
107 Page 25 of Geddes and Niessen (2005) states that “it does not reflect how well immigrants are actually in-
cluded into Europe’s economies and societies…They are about law and the options are legal options. They are
not about practices and how the law is (not applied).”
108 Once the data have been compiled by national experts following the completion of a questionnaire, “[i]n order
to be able to compare Member States and to establish whether civic citizenship measures are put in place, a list
of almost 100 measures with each [of the] three options was sent as a questionnaire to independent experts who
determined for all measures which option applies for their country”. For a list of the experts who took part in the
index, see the Annex of Niessen, M.J. Peiro and Y. Schibel, Civic Citizenship and Immigrant Inclusion – A Guide
for the Implementation of Civic Citizenship Policies, Migration Policy Group, Brussels, 2005.
109
“What are the eligibility requirements for the status? What is the scope of anti-discrimination legislation? How
easy is access to the labour market?”
110
“What are the conditions that immigrants need to fulfill to access the status? What are the remedies available
in cases of discrimination? How secure is employment?”
111
“How secure is the status? How strong are the equality agencies which monitor anti-discrimination? What
labour market integration measures exist to facilitate migrants’ inclusion?”
112
“What are the rights associated with the status? What are the pro-active policies in place to combat discrimi-
nation?”
113 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in
employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000; Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 19 June 2000 implementing
the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000.
114 Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA) and Migration Policy Group (MPG), The Amsterdam Pro-
posals: The ILPA/MPG proposed directives on immigration and asylum, prepared by Steven Peers and
coordinated by E. Guild, S. Rowlands and J. Niessen, ILPA and MPG, London and Brussels, 2000. See for in-
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two-pronged comparison. First it compares member states’ integration legislation with “the framework
of desirable policy”. Second, it compares how each member state’s integration legislation measures
up to that of the other member states.
The benchmarking envisaged by the index can only work with a set of indicators. Annex 1 of the index
presents its list of indicators that apply per strand and dimension of integration. Overall, it makes use
of 100 indicators related to specific policies in each of the strands, “based on the existing commit-
ments of member states to give immigrants rights and obligations comparable to EU citizens” and
“whether they are living up to their commitments at EU level”, which they call “promises of equality”.
On the basis of the purported normative framework, “the choice and wording of the indicators are
[also] inspired by NGO proposals, EU legislation and international conventions”. The authors of the
index state that the indicators do not tell whether inclusion has been successful or not. The index only
measures whether the legal and policy frameworks are “favorable”. For instance, it is interesting to
note that the index qualifies as “unfavorable” or “worse practice” the use of “integration conditions” as
provided by both the Directives it references as its assessment baseline. The index also values condi-
tions going beyond a language test as “unfavorable”.  
The use of indicators is intended to measure the favorable or unfavorable nature of a particular policy
option for “immigrant inclusion”. This measurement is calibrated using three markers: favorable (which
equates to best practice), less favorable and least favorable conditions (which equates to worst prac-
tice). Favorable describes “more liberal provisions and interpretations” assessed in the context of the
normative framework explained earlier in this chapter. The other two elements of measurement reflect
more restrictive regulations on integration. For each indicator, member states are given a score of 1–
3, with 3 being the most favorable score, 2 less favorable and 1 the least favorable.115 If a member
state had no legislation at all then a score of 1 was given. The index carries out a numerical exercise
calculating “averages” and “indices”: “A strand average per country is calculated as the average of all
the indicators in the strand…The dimension average per country per strand is calculated as the mean
of all the indicators in the dimension, in the strand…For each strand, the EU average is calculated as
an arithmetic mean of the 15 scores.”116 The index presents member states’ scores in two forms:
score values (comparing member states’ integration policies with the European normative framework,
measuring how favorable policies are to “immigrant inclusion”) and index values (comparing member
states with each other). Score values can vary greatly among countries, as the 1–3 scale values a set
stance I. Chopin, “The Starting Line Group: A Harmonized Approach to Fight Racism and to Promote Equal
Treatment”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1999, pp. 111–29; see also I. Chopin and J.
Niessen, Proposals for legislative measures to combat racism and to promote equal rights in the European Un-
ion, co-published by the Starting Line Group and the British Commission for Racial Equality, London, 1998; and
also I. Chopin, “Possible Harmonization of Anti-Discrimination Legislation in the European Union: European and
Non-Governmental Proposals”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 2, Nos. 3-4, 2000, pp. 413–30.
115 The report explains that in the anti-discrimination strand, the score depended on the number of areas covered
by a particular normative measure (a rating of 3 was given when the act included race/ethnicity, religion/belief
and nationality; 2 when it covered two areas, and 1 when it only included one or no discrimination grounds. See
footnote 10 of Geddes and Niessen, 2005).
116 Ibid.
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of 100 indicators. The score calculation is given to two decimal places, “which allows for a more nu-
anced reading”. Concerning the index values, the 1–3 range is converted into a standardized base
that uses 100 as equivalent to the EU average. If a country scores more than 100, this means that the
country is performing above the EU average.
3.3 The Migrant Integration Policy Index
The Migration Policy Group and the British Council also produced the second edition of the index
(henceforth, MIPEX).117 This time it was co-funded by the European Commission (DG JFS, INTI Pro-
gram).118 The main objective of the MIPEX is
[t]o improve migrant integration policies in Europe, by providing objective, accessible and
comparable data for scrutiny and debate…it is therefore vital that the integration policies of
European governments are scrutinized and monitored. MIPEX is intended as a ‘mirror’ that
can be held up to Member States for them to see how they are performing on migrant inte-
gration policy.119 (emphasis added)
The MIPEX evaluates integration policies in the EU-25, as well as in Canada, Switzerland and Norway
as of 1 March 2007. It covers six areas that “shape a migrant’s journey to full citizenship: labour mar-
ket access, family reunion, long-term residence, political participation, access to nationality and anti-
discrimination”.120 “Best practice” in each policy indicator is equalized at the highest “European stan-
dard”, which it defines in a similar way as the 2005 index. The MIPEX normative framework then
describes “European standards” as the best practice against which to test member states’ policies.
The standards assessed by the MIPEX are those relevant to TCNs legally residing in an EU member
state. The focus is on government policy and its legal/policy framework. The MIPEX defines integra-
tion as “equal or mutual opportunities and responsibilities for all, both in socio-economic and civic
terms”. Furthermore, it defines benchmarking as “[a] tool for policy improvement based on the identifi-
cation of key areas of improvement, setting standards and indicators, searching for best practices that
meet those standards, and adapting policies from lessons learned to meet and exceed these stan-
dards”.121
117 J. Niessen, T. Huddleston and L. Citron (in cooperation with A. Geddes and D. Jacobs), Migrant Integration
Policy Index, British Council and Migration Policy Group, Brussels, 2007 (www.integrationindex.eu); see also J.
Niessen, “Integration, Citizenship and the Benchmarking of Integration in the EU”, in S. Carrera (ed.), The Nexus
between Immigration, Integration and Citizenship in the EU, Collective Conference Volume, Centre for European
Policy Studies, Brussels, April 2006, pp. 33–37.
118 See the website http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/2004_2007/inti/funding_inti_en.htm.
119 See Niessen, Huddleston and Citron (2007).
120 Integration programs, access to housing, education and health care are cross-cutting issues.
121 See p. 6 of Niessen, Huddleston and Citron (2007).
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The MIPEX methodology is also similar to that of the 2005 index. In each strand or policy area, it
measures best practice based on the European standards it constructs.122 Each strand is divided into
the same four dimensions as in the index. The report adds that
[a] country receives a 1-3 score on each indicator…the indicator scores in each dimension
are averaged together to give a dimension score. Each strand therefore has four dimension
scores. The average of the four dimension scores in each strand produces a strand score.
Each country therefore has six strand scores. The six strands are then averaged together
to give an overall score for each country. Other averages (EU25/15/10) are calculated as a
simple mean score of the given countries. The initial 1–3 scale is converted into a 0–100
scale for dimensions and strands, where 100% is best practice. Rankings and comparisons
can then be made on the basis of these scores.123
The MIPEX assesses 140 policy indicators, which are presented in Annex 4 of this study.124 Their
evaluation is based on the same baseline as the 2005 index. Yet the policy indicators are more finely
tuned and there are more of them. According to the report, “[t]he indicators were designed through a
series of expert consultations and later scrutinised and approved by MIPEX’s Scientific Advisory
Committee”.125 Each of the 140 indicators relates to a specific policy area in one of the six strands. It is
said that “they have been designed to benchmark laws and policies against these highest European
standards”.126
3.4 Study on Setting up a System of Benchmarking to Measure the Success of
Integration Policies in Europe
The study on Setting up a System of Benchmarking was carried out by the MPG and funded by the
DG for Internal Policies of the Union (Policy Department C) of the European Parliament.127 Its objec-
tives are to explore the extent to which the technique of benchmarking “can be transferred from the
122 It is said that “[s]ome of these standards are contained in EC Directives, which EU Member States are
obliged to transpose into their national laws. Others come from Council of Europe Conventions that ratifying
States have committed to implement. Where Directives and Conventions only provide minimum standards or
allow numerous derogations, MIPEX turns to higher standards of best practice: EC Presidency Conclusions,
proposals for EC Directives put forward by European-wide stakeholders, or the policy recommendations of com-
prehensive comparable European research projects” (Niessen, Huddleston and Citron, 2007, p. 5).
123 Ibid., p. 6.
124 It is important to highlight that each of the indicators constitute the set of questions sent to the national ex-
perts in the form of a questionnaire. They are presented in Annex 2 of the MIPEX “List of Indicators”.
125 See Niessen, Huddleston and Citron (2007).
126 Ibid.
127 J. Niessen and T. Huddleston (with N. Verbruggen and M.A. Kate), Setting up a System of Benchmarking to
Measure the Success of Integration Policies in Europe, PE 378.288, Policy Department C, Citizens Rights and
Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament, January 2007.
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private sector and be used in the public sector”, 128 to propose an organized and targeted European
system for benchmarking integration policies and to put forward a set of policy recommendations rele-
vant to benchmarking the effectiveness of a future integration framework for the EU. The study starts
with an in-depth analysis of benchmarking. After assessing its origins in the private sector,129 where
this method has been used to ensure a “continuous and systematic search for and implementation of
best practices, which lead to superior performance”, the following elements are identified as features
of this technique: 1) identifying key areas to be improved, 2) setting standards according to “best/good
practice”, 3) examining how actors meet the standards, and 4) adapting and applying “lessons
learned” to meet or exceed the standards. As regards the conceptual setting, the European Parliament
study introduces a working definition of benchmarking, founded on a “citizens-based approach”. It ad-
vocates a common definition of integration driven by a “European framework concept of integration”,
which
should situate integration policies within the broader context of sustainable economic de-
velopment and social cohesion. Integration policies must encourage immigrants and
nationals alike to become active citizens. It must promote solidarity and equality among all
members of society.130 (emphasis added)
The understanding of integration as including civic citizenship is discussed in Chapter Seven of the
study. The study’s authors (similar to those of the 2005 index and the MIPEX) base their definition of
integration on their interpretation of the European framework and the Council of Europe’s understand-
ing of immigration and integration.131 In particular, as regards the European framework they refer to
the 1999 Tampere Program. They point to European citizenship and equality based on anti-
discrimination as “the optimal standard”. They state that “the EU Framework definition of integration is
characterized by its gradual ‘comparable rights and obligations’ approach, which aims to be compre-
hensive, multidimensional, voluntary and as follows collaborative among many levels of
governance”.132 Successful integration is considered to include the active participation of all residents,
the respect and exercise of “comparable rights and responsibilities”, and the acquisition of “intercul-
tural competencies”.133
The scope of the study exclusively covers the integration of legally resident TCNs or “newcomers”. In
Chapter Five, “From Integration Impediments to Areas of Improvement”, the study explains the
benchmarking system’s methodology. It intends to provide “benchmarkers” with the necessary instru-
ments for measuring “immigration integration debates” and to pinpoint “integration impediments and
128 Ibid.
129 For instance, they quote and make use of the publication by the European Foundation for Quality Manage-
ment (EFQM), Excellence Toolbook for Benchmarking, EFQM, Brussels, 2003 (see www.efqm.org).
130 See Niessen and Huddleston (2007), p. 59.
131 See M. Coussey, Framework of Integration Policies, Council of Europe, Directorate General III – Social Co-
hesion, Directorate of Social Affairs and Health, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2000.
132 See Niessen and Huddleston (2007), p. 67.
133 Ibid., p. 146.
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areas of improvement”. The study starts by explaining how “the decision to benchmark” is based on a
preliminary assessment of the situation, which “informs the decision to benchmark, focuses the
benchmarking and makes it relevant for the ongoing policy debates”.134 The preliminary assessment
consists of identifying a number of “ongoing discussions” or “integration debates” in the EU.135 The
assessment would aim at distinguishing a number of “impediments”, which are defined as “policies (or
the lack thereof) and societal realities that hamper the ability of a diverse society to ensure the long-
term well-being of all its members”.136 The search for impediments could result in some bases for
benchmarking and in turn launch research to identify standards, targets, best practices and indicators.
Chapter Three introduces four “dimensions of well-being” intended to offer a comprehensive picture of
these qualities in a diverse society: 1) non-discrimination, 2) dignity, 3) development, and 4) participa-
tion. They are then applied to “four areas of life” subject to public policies, which include citizenship,
economic inclusion, social cohesion (housing and health care services)137 and education. Therefore,
using “the technique of impediment searching”, the natural step would be to identify specific obstacles
in each area of life by dimension of well-being. The subsequent step would be to transform the im-
pediments into “areas of improvement” or “action-oriented policy goals”. The study elaborates as
follows:
The identification of impediments permits benchmarkers to develop policies and services
that turn impediments into clear-cut and constructive areas of improve-
ment…benchmarkers may then enter the benchmarking exercise’s analysis by undergoing
policy assessments on their current policy response, identify standards and search for and
study best practice on this specific area of improvement.138
The focus on turning impediments into areas of improvement would need to follow the “ideal standard”
(standard-setting) or normative framework outlined by the study,139 which consists of eliminating the
specific impediment “in order to encourage the well-being of all members of society, with a focus on
active participation, the acquisition of competences and the granting of comparable rights and respon-
sibilities”. According to the model, for the purpose of “analysis” and “implementation” benchmarkers
would develop “quantitative or qualitative” indicators related to the processes of policy formulation or
134 Ibid., p. 99.
135 It is interesting to note that among those mentioned is the issue of “shared values” (and integration as an
immigration control mechanism), yet then the decision it made not to “benchmark” it (ibid., p. 101).
136 Ibid., p. 104.
137 See also Annex 1 of the study entitled “Migrant-Friendliness Quality Questionnaire”, in which a set of ques-
tions are presented to measure whether hospitals are “migrant-friendly” (pp. 247–52).
138 See Niessen and Huddleston (2007), p. 130.
139 Annex 4 entitled “Normative Framework of European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index” (pp. 264–73)
states that “[e]quality and access are cornerstones of European immigration integration policies. Equal treatment
of immigrants is often a condition for their admission in terms of working and living conditions and they acquire
more rights and assume more responsibilities over time in this way gradually becoming full and active citizens.
Policies can set favourable integration conditions and they include securing residence, facilitating family reunion,
encouraging naturalisation and combating discrimination. These areas, taken together, promote civic citizen-
ship.”
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the outcomes (efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability). Chapter Six argues that “integration can be
measured in terms of successes and failures and integration policies in terms of strengths and weak-
nesses”, and the use of indicators serves as the instrument for assessing success and effectiveness.
The following indicators are presented, with the option for “the benchmarker” to choose those more
appropriate: 1) context indicators (including for instance a situational context, such as the number of
immigrants in the receiving population); 2) governance indicators (the normative situation in the coun-
try with respect to international and European laws and policies); 3) global/outcome indicators (relating
outcomes and impact to general policy goals in a long-term perspective); 4) output indicators (con-
cerning specific policy goals with a short-term outlook); 5) operational/input indicators (operational
objectives in terms of goods and services); and 6) process/performance indicators (relevance, effi-
ciency, effectiveness and sustainability).
The European Parliament study uses graphs similar to those provided by the MIPEX to represent in-
tegration policy in an area of life. In fact, the second part of the study constitutes a sort of update of
the MIPEX, following the same conceptual and methodological patterns precisely.140 Finally, we come
to the phase of policy intervention, which is to consist of “the goals set by the ‘areas of improvement’
[that] are amenable to a combination of public interventions”.141 The study notes that it aims at combin-
ing the Council of Europe’s approach on measuring integration by looking at processes (“process
approach”)142 with the MIPEX methodology (“normative approach”).
3.5 Benchmarking Integration at the Local and Regional Levels
This subsection assesses some examples of the increasing practice of benchmarking integration at
the local and regional levels in the EU. In particular we look at: 1) the integration policy in Berlin, 2) the
INTI Cities project (“Benchmarking Integration Governance in European Cities”), and 3) the Migrants’
Integration Territorial Index (MITI project).
140 In addition, Annex 5 of the study presents a list of research reports by country that were consulted by the
national experts when responding to a questionnaire very similar to the one used in the MIPEX (see pp. 274–
83).
141 In this way, the study establishes “four cross-cutting levels of policy intervention” in each of the “areas of life”:
1) the existence of law and policy framing, 2) implementation and service delivery, 3) beneficiaries (the situation
of immigrants), and 4) climate in the receiving society.
142 Council of Europe, Measurement and Indicators of Integration, Community Relations Series, Strasbourg,
1997; see also Council of Europe, Proposed Indicators for Measuring Integration of Immigrants and Minorities
with a View to Equal Rights and Opportunities for all, MG-IN, Strasbourg 2003. The study states that “[w]hereas
the Council of Europe started the discussion on indicators with a view to promote the societal integration of im-
migrants, the European Union used the development of indicators as a means to measure progress in the
achievement of the Lisbon goals. While the Council moved from specific immigrant integration indicators to more
general social inclusion indicators, the European Union started with general social, economic and educational
indicators and is now beginning to add to those specific immigrant integration indicators.”
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3.5.1 Integration Policy in Berlin 2007-2011
The Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin published a report in 2008
entitled Encouraging Diversity – Strengthening Cohesion, Integration Policy in Berlin 2007-2011,143
which presents an overview of its current policy strategies for integration. The report describes one of
the essential aspects of the policy as being a “better understanding for better governing”, adding that
Berlin is the first state government in Germany to introduce “a system of integration monitoring”.144
The conceptual understanding of integration that it advocates is as follows:
‘Diversity means strength’ – this fundamental principle for a modern corporate culture suits
especially Berlin…besides encouraging cultural diversity, integration in the view of such [a]
pressing background should first and foremost guarantee equal opportunities for individuals
or entire groups to participate in social life and articulate their own interest, as well as to be
protected from individual and collective marginalization. Therefore, integration policy con-
cerns primarily the establishment of equal opportunities.145
Furthermore, concerning the personal scope of the initiative, the report makes this point:
The statistical differentiation between German and foreigner is not sufficient to serve as a
foundation for integration monitoring. It is, furthermore, not adequate to reveal the social
reality in the immigration city of Berlin. Therefore, the Senate aims at a gradual replace-
ment of the criterion ‘nationality’ through the criterion ‘immigrant background’ in the data
collection.146
The “Berlin integration policy” has been structured around seven fundamental strategies, each of them
presenting general and specific objectives, a set of indicators and related projects. The strategies and
general objectives are the following:
1. to develop the international appeal and vision of the cultural diversity of the city;
2. to guarantee that immigrants receive the same access to vocational training and employment (in-
tegration through participation in the labor market);
143 Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin (ed.), Encouraging Diversity – Strengthen-
ing Cohesion, Integration Policy in Berlin 2007-2011, Der Beauftragte für Integration und Migration, Berlin, 2007.
144 See section 1 of the report, under the heading “The essentials of the integration policy of Berlin 2007-2011”,
which identifies the following eight: 1) one city – many lifeworlds; 2) an occupational perspective for everyone; 3)
recognize and develop talents; 4) adjustment and responsibilities; 5) the Berlin Senate departments deliver ser-
vices to all the citizens; 6) activation and participation; 7) against exclusion; and 8) better understanding stands
for better governing.
145 See in particular section 3 of the report, under the heading “Guiding Theme and Strategic Reformation in the
Integration Policy of Berlin”, p. 16. It also states that “Berlin is a city with strong ability for integration. The living
together of people from various social, cultural and religious backgrounds becomes the scene of urban normal-
ity. This attitude of placid openness for the different and the new is a cultural treasure of Berlin with a distinctive
long history.”
146 See p. 8 of the report.
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3. to align the attainment of language proficiency in all the stages of education among students and
to equalize the participation of adult immigrants in opportunities for vocational and further training
(integration through education, and recognition and promotion of every talent);
4. to stabilize those quarters with social distress and concentrations of immigrant families, to
strengthen urban cohesion and to improve equal opportunity (integration through the strengthen-
ing of urban cohesion);
5. to ensure equal access to services, infrastructure and quality (integration through intercultural
opening);
6. to foster political participation, protection against discrimination and equal treatment (integration
through participation and the strengthening of civil society); and
7. to ensure that both refugees and asylum seekers receive protection and prospects of integration
(prospects for the integration of refugees).
As an illustration, the report identifies the following subset of objectives as regards the sixth strategy
(on “integration through participation and the strengthening of civil society”): increase the number of
persons naturalized in Berlin; further develop the State Advisory Board for Integration; improve the
possibilities for political participation through the establishment of advisory boards and committees of
immigrants; extend the prevention and intervention measures in the protection against racist, anti-
Semitic and gender-related discrimination or violence; and enhance the work with young male immi-
grants. It then outlines a selection of indicators and their significance for reviewing the objectives,
which include the shares of persons with a municipal voting right, of representatives with an immigrant
background in the House of Representatives, of bi-national marriages and registered partnerships, of
“victims of criminal offences of foreigners compared with the number of German suspects”, of “sus-
pects in all burglary offences from non-German and German” backgrounds, and of registered racist or
anti-Semitic violence in relation to the resident population (see Annex 3 of this study). The report does
not offer any further information as to how achievement in each of the spheres/strategies for action will
be measured.
3.5.2 INTI Cities: Benchmarking Integration Governance in European Cities
The INTI Cities project is co-funded by the INTI program of the European Commission (DG FSJ). It is
coordinated by Eurocities in collaboration with the MPG and the ‘ethics etc.’ consultancy group.147 The
network is composed of 12 cities: Amaroussion, Belfast, Barcelona, Düsseldorf, Genoa, Helsinki,
Lyon, Malmö, Milan, Rotterdam, Tampere and Utrecht. The rationale of the project is “to assist cities in
developing and improving their integration policies and linking the local level to policy-makers at na-
tional and European level” and “by assessing (their) integration policies by using the method of peer
147 See the consultancy group’s website (http://ethicsetc.co.uk).
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review”.148 This project therefore does not intend to measure or benchmark the integration of TCNs
per se, but rather assess “integration governance structures” in those selected European cities. It con-
stitutes a benchmarking technique for evaluating cities’ policies and strategies in this policy domain.
Among the specific objectives, the project seeks “to develop a benchmarking model for multi-
dimensional integration governance intending to overcome fragmentation of policy-making and ser-
vice-delivery and actively involving immigrants”, and to help cities to develop and improve their
services and policies.149 It assesses three aspects of governance: structures and their effectiveness in
administrative cooperation, policies in support of individual migrant empowerment, and policies creat-
ing and supporting partnerships with civil society and immigrant associations.
The INTI Cities project uses a benchmarking model to determine best practice through
a peer review approach which will go beyond a simple good practice collection to deliver
expert-validated comparative knowledge on integration practices in European cities as well
as on the necessary supportive policy environments at local, national, and European lev-
els.150
Concerning the methodology, six of the twelve participating cities were asked to self-assess their pro-
gress toward “ideal performance in integration governance” against a set of “INTI Cities
benchmarks”.151 The assessment aims at incorporating quantitative as well as qualitative data. Each
city was asked to report in relation to five dimensions: municipality profile, general governance, indi-
vidual empowerment, administrative cooperation and working in partnership. These dimensions have
been attributed a number of indicators covering the following elements: ambition, leadership, re-
sources, implementation and evaluation.152 For example, as regards individual empowerment the
indicators cover
(1) the provision of multi-dimensional active citizenship skills to individual migrants, ranging
for instance from language classes and skills and competencies recognition to information
about opportunities for voluntary services (such as serving on school councils), political
participation, etc.; and (2) direct and facilitated access to mainstream services.153
148 See the project leaflet available at the website www.inticities.eu/en.
149 See the presentation “Strategic thinking on equality and mobility” delivered by Jan Niessen at the second INTI
Cities Conference of 5–6 November 2007 in Milan (retrieved from
http://www.migpolgroup.com/events/3836.html).
150 Ibid.
151 See the “Guidance on How to Prepare the Initial Report”, INTI Cities Project, Brussels, 2008 (retrieved from
www.inticities.eu/en). They have included six cities: Düsseldorf, Genoa, Helsinki, Lyon, Malmö and Rotterdam.
152 This is the case for all of the dimensions, exception for “municipality profile”, which is being tested against a
specific set of indicators: location, structure and services, decision-making, strategies and plans, implementation,
resources and provenance (ibid).
153 Ibid., see also point 2.3 in Chapter 3 of the study, on “Individual Empowerment”.
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Concerning the dimension of working in partnership they include “the establishment of specific, formal
and informal, structures designed to enhance working partnerships with civil society organisations
(local NGOs, religious communities, media, etc.), private sector organisations, interest groups and
migrant associations”.154
Finally, concerning the dimension of general governance the project argues that “the ‘ideal municipal-
ity’ has a strategic and city-wide approach to its integration policy”.155 (See also Annex 7 of this study
for the list of indicators used to measure general governance).
A group of peer-reviewers are evaluating the self-assessment reports of the cities against the ‘ideal
municipality’ and the set of INTI Cities benchmarks through a “desk review” of the reports156 and visits
to all six cities (gathering evidence and conducting interviews with key stakeholders).157 This “stan-
dardised peer review method” aims at providing “feedback on successes and potential improvements
or gaps between the actual performance of the city partner and the benchmark” and coming up with a
collection of “good practices” destined for what the project calls “the European integration community”
as “guidance on innovative integration governance”.158
154 See the “Guidance on How to Prepare the Initial Report”, INTI Cities Project, Brussels (retrieved from
www.inticities.eu/en), 2008.
155 Ibid.
156 The Training Manual distinguishes two kinds of possible “gaps”: evidence gaps, which consist of the differ-
ences between the meaning of the words in the benchmark and those in the report, and performance gaps,
which constitute differences in the achievements of the city compared with the benchmark (see p. 8 of the Train-
ing Manual). The peer review reports will have the following structure: “[c]larity and appropriateness of the policy
objectives and the extent to which they reflect a commitment to move towards the principles of integration gov-
ernance as set out in the benchmark; [t]he nature and extent of stakeholder involvement in agreeing these
objectives; [t]he appropriateness of the institutional arrangements (joint working and strategies) that have been
put in place to achieve the objectives and whether they are, or are likely to achieve their objectives; [t]he appro-
priateness of the actions being taken to achieve the objectives; and [a]dequacy of the finance committed to
achieve the objectives” (see p. 25 of the Training Manual).
157 For this purpose the project has created a set of operational guidelines for implementing peer reviews that
include detailed instructions on their content, organization and related training (practical application of the meth-
odology). See INTI Cities Project, Peer Review Methodology: Training Manual, Workpackage 2b, INTI Cities
Project, 2008 (retrieved from www.inticities.eu/en). The training was carried out by the consultancy group ‘ethics
etc…’ to assist and support the six peer review teams.
158 See footnote 154 above.
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3.5.3 The MITI Project: Migrants’ Integration Territorial Index
The MITI project was co-financed by the INTI program of the European Commission (DG FSJ).159 The
project involved a partnership drawn from five member states: the Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS
(Rome), the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches (CERI) (Paris), Middlesex University (London), Asso-
ciation Salud y Familia (Barcelona) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (Lisbon). It
aimed at overcoming the lack of comparative data on integration by providing a comparative assess-
ment of the different degrees of “socio-economic integration” of TCNs across various geographical
areas. The territorial scope included regions and major metropolitan areas – the capital cities of the
partners’ member states with the exception of Spain, which studied the case of Barcelona.160
The project developed its own working concept of integration as the premise upon which the identifica-
tion and assessment of indicators was conducted: “Integration is the condition (and process) of feeling
a full and active member of the society in which one lives, having the means and opportunities to par-
ticipate, as far as one chooses, in the wider social and cultural context.”161
It is interesting, however, to note the way in which the French report (for example) went deeper into
the conceptual issues of integration (described by the authors as “the question of integration in French
research”) and departed somehow from the shared theoretical framework.162 While the personal scope
exclusively covered TCNs, it stated that “only when the available data does not allow [disaggregation
159 The MITI project leaflet is available at the Middlesex University website
(http://www.mdx.ac.uk/hssc/research/centres/sprc/projects.asp). and also http://www.dossierimmigrazione.it/
miti.htm). The project started in September 2006, with a timeframe of 18 months. See C. Withol De Wenden et
al., Measuring Integration: The French Case – Regional indices of social and labour market inclusion of third
country nationals, Final Report, Sciences Po, CERI, Paris, March 2008 (retrieved from http://www.ceri-sciences-
po.org). Refer also to E. Mendez et al., Measuring Integration: The Spanish Case – Regional indices of social
and labour market inclusion of third country nationals, Final Report, Asociación Salud y Familia, Barcolena, 2008
(retrieved from http://www.saludyfamilia.es/projectes/miti.htm).
160 The specific objectives of the project were as follows: to set up an international network to promote discus-
sion on immigrants’ integration and exchange best on practice research; to identify and discuss definitions,
characteristics and indicators of integration throughout Europe; to collect and analyze comparable statistics from
the participating countries, in their regions and in selected metropolitan areas; and to explore ways to measure
some aspects of immigrants’ integration from the analysis of available data at national and regional levels. Refer
to the MITI project leaflet (http://www.mdx.ac.uk/hssc/research/centres/sprc/projects.asp).
161 See p. 10 of the report by C. Withol De Wenden et al. (2008). The project argued that “[t]o facilitate this proc-
ess it is necessary to provide conditions such as rights – both formal access to social, civil and political rights,
and substantive access to rights (e.g. nondiscrimination, freedom from harassment); the ability to act independ-
ently – based on the knowledge of language/structures of society (e.g. how to access services); the material
resources to participate in all aspects of life within the community (e.g. adequate housing, employment appropri-
ate to skills/qualifications, access to education and health); extensive local networks (social/emotional and
instrumental); a sense of belonging and trust (with the ability to choose to maintain, adapt and reject aspects of
cultural traditions from country of origin/host country, and with the presence of national/ethnic groups ‘taken for
granted’ and visible within the mainstream)” (ibid.).
162 It is also interesting to note that the report on the French case used as the working definition the conceptions
advocated by Dominique Schnapper in Qu’est-ce que l’intégration?, Folio Actuel 125, Paris: Gallimard, 2007
(see pp. 20–22 of the report).
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of] this specific section of the population, was the general ‘foreign’ population used”.163 The bench-
marking exercise was based on a comparison between the situation of TCNs and that enjoyed by EU
citizens or “the national population…in order to understand the gaps” between these two groups in
each of the areas specified by using a common list of indicators.
As regards the methodology, the MITI project identified three main areas for the analysis of integration
at both the national and regional levels in each member state under study:
1) ‘Index of absorptive capacity’: measuring the capacity of a local area to attract and keep
a sizable foreign population); 2) ‘Index of social stability’: measuring the level of social in-
clusion and adaptation in each local area; and 3) ‘Index of labour market’: measuring the
level and type of inclusion of migrants in the local labour market.164
Concerning the scales of indicators, the report explained that
[f]or each indicator of the main grid, a ranking was drawn up comparing regions of each
country on the basis of their relative values (numerical or percentage) starting from the
maximum value at the top to the minimum at the bottom. The values were standardised us-
ing a method which is known in the academic literature as conversion to ‘percentage
score’: this consists [of] organising the regional data for each indicator into a same prede-
termined scale (scoring from 1 to 100)…In this way it is possible to bring different kind[s] of
data, related to different phenomena, into a common scale. In order to facilitate the inter-
pretation of the scale, each was subdivided into 5 levels of intensity on the basis of point
scores: 1 to 20, minimum; 21 to 40, low; 41 to 60, average; 61 to 80, high; 81 to 100,
maximum.165
According to the report, the ‘percentage score’ method used to standardize the values of indicators
involves
converting the data for each indicator into the same score scale, from a minimum of 1 to a
maximum of 100, distributing scores for intermediate absolute values in proportion to the
distance of these absolute values in the ranking; and, above all, independently of the fact
that the original ranking may consist of all positive, or all negative values or a mixture of the
two.166
163 The French report also stated that “[f]or the purpose of comparability, we concentrated on foreign popula-
tions. However, for some indicators, newly French populations or second generations had to be taken into
account. This is even truer as [French] statistics generally tend to grasp immigrant population by groups, without
necessarily distinguishing between their nationalities, rather than by foreigners as is the case in States with re-
cent immigration” (C. Withol De Wenden et al., 2008, p. 23).
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid., p. 14.
166 The report described the standardization procedure as consisting of two phases: the first places the original
absolute gaps, on which the rankings for each indicator are constructed, in relation to the mean square devia-
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It is finally worth underlining that when looking at the actual results of the French report, there is at this
stage not any evident use of the purported common methodology of measurement of the statistical
data according to ‘the percentage score’ and the indicators.
4 Moving the Debate on Benchmarking Integration Forward: Cur-
rent Deficits
This section assesses some of the inherent vulnerabilities in benchmarking the integration of TCNs in
the EU. On the basis of the assessment carried out in Chapter Three, the main weaknesses can be
grouped under the following overarching headings: the lack of a common approach, the lack of neu-
trality, difficulties in relation to the personal and territorial scope, and defects in the methodology.
4.1 A Common Approach on Integration in EU Law/Policy?
A key premise for enabling any benchmarking exercise to take place is the existence of a common
conceptual understanding of or guiding approach to integration. The approach will determine the
focus and direction given to each of the phases that make up the monitoring and evaluation of bench-
marking. There is, however, a conceptual deficit in relation to the constructed category of
integration in the EU, in both the academic and policy domains.167 This deficit is not so much
linked to the need for a precise definition of what integration actually means,168 but rather to the diffi-
culty of achieving a shared understanding on integration that is commonly accepted in a diverse,
tion, transforming these into standardized gaps (score 1); and the second applies a specific formula to the stan-
dardized gaps in order to transform them into percentage scores (score 2) (ibid., p. 16).
167 There are as many definitions and conceptualizations of ‘integration’ as scholars dealing with this and other
related themes all across the various academic disciplines of the social sciences. Among other see G.R. De
Groot, “Reflections on Integration and Access to Nationality/Citizenship through Naturalization: A Comparative
Perspective”, in S. Carrera (ed.), The Nexus between Immigration, Integration and Citizenship in the EU, Collec-
tive Conference Volume, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, April 2006, pp. 21–27; S. Carrera,
“Integration as a process of inclusion for migrants? The case of long-term residents in the EU”, in H. Schneider
(ed.), Migration, Integration and Citizenship: A Challenge for Europe’s Future, Maastricht: Forum Maastricht,
2005, pp. 109–38; M. Pajares, La Integración Ciudadana: Una Perspectiva para la Inmigración, Barcelona:
Icaria Antrazyt, 2005; R. Penninx, “Integration of Migrants: Economic, Social, Cultural and Political Dimensions”,
in M. Macura, A.L. MacDonald and W. Haug (eds), The New Demographic Regime: Population Challenges and
Policy Responses, New York/Geneva: United Nations, 2005, pp. 137-52; K. Groenendijk, “Legal Concepts of
Integration in EU Migration Law”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2004, pp. 111–26; A.
Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain, London: Mac-
millan, 1998; and S. Castles, and M.J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the
Modern World, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003.
168 Berliner Beiträge zur Integration und Migration, Indikatoren zur Messung von Integrationserfolgen: Ergeb-
nisse des Transnationalen Projekts, Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit und Soziales, Berlin, 2007. It is said
that “the concept of integration should be precisely defined for the monitoring of integration in order to make it
applicable” (see pp. 86 and 87).
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supranational governance setting such as the EU.169 As a Council of Europe report (1997) rightly ar-
gued,
the evaluation or measurement of integration has to begin with a definition of the basis
terms…what exactly is meant by the term “integration” is of great importance. Without
common standards as to what is meant by “migrant” and by “integration” all attempts to
measure migrants’ integration in different countries are likely to be of little meaning.170
Is there any identifiable, common European approach to integration in EU law/policy? As analyzed in
Section 1 of this report, the classical features characterizing the European approaches to integration
adopted at the Tampere Program of 1999 have greatly evolved in the last few years, in both the scope
of EU immigration law and the EU framework on integration. It would therefore be difficult to argue that
there is one (or several) predominant and clearly-identified approach(es) to integration in EU law and
policy. Its meanings and functions are highly dynamic and constantly changing. Integration is subject
to malleable framing in EU law and policy. Instead of closely following the tenets of equality, citizen-
ship, the two-way process and the EU paradigm on fair and near-equality treatment, there is a
tendency to use integration as a condition for granting TCNs access to security of residence,
family reunion and social inclusion. This approach appears to prevail not only in some provisions of
Directives 2003/109 and 2003/86, but also in the EU framework on integration.
Annex 2 of this report illustrates how the interpretation of integration used by some of the studies ex-
amined above is unfortunately not the predominant at the official EU level. On the contrary, the
meanings attributed to integration in EU law and policy have shifted toward the management of
immigration and an “acculturation dimension” within and outside the EU. This trend is also rep-
resentative of some of the current policies and immigration laws at the national level.171 The shift of
paradigms in the normative understandings of integration in the EU creates tension between what is at
times referred to as a ‘citizen-centered approach’ and a ‘migration-control approach’. This issue points
to one of the main vulnerabilities in benchmarking: the importance of the driving conceptual and ideo-
logical focus/approach/understanding of integration. Some studies distinguish a series of integration
dimensions, such as socio-economic, legal–political and cultural ones.172 Nevertheless, the actual
169 At the local level this deficit might prove to be less relevant.
170 Council of Europe (1997), Measurement and Indicators of Integration, Community Relations, Directorate of
Social and Economic Affairs, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1997, p. 5.
171 S. Carrera, “Integration of Immigrants versus Social Inclusion? A Typology of Integration Programs in the
EU”, in T. Balzacq and S. Carrera, Security versus Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s Future, Aldershot: Ash-
gate, 2006(a), pp. 87–112; see also S. Carrera, “Programas de integración para inmigrantes: una perspectiva
comparada en la Unión Europea”, Revista Migraciones, N. 20, Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, Madrid,
2006(b), pp. 37–73.
172 Other instances include B. Schulte, “The Open Method of Coordination as a Political Strategy in the Field of
Immigrant Integration Policy”, in R. Süssmuth and W. Weidenfeld (eds), Managing Integration: The European
Union’s Responsibilities towards Immigrants, Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2004, pp. 137–45; and
Caritas Europa, Integration: A Process Involving All, Advocacy Paper on the Integration of Migrants and Refu-
gees, Caritas Europa, Brussels, August 2007. In the latter, after explaining that the definition of integration
advocated by Caritas Europa includes the respect for fundamental rights, equality and participation (p. 6), it dis-
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measurement of each of them will greatly depend on the theoretical framing or working definition of
integration.
Although the CBPs intend to offer an initial, harmonized background defining the main principles for
integration in the EU,173 they rather encapsulate a certain number of perceived shared features that
are too broad in nature to provide any clear vision and concise response to the deficit. The CBPs rep-
resent a non-binding guide of broad principles allowing for the implementation and development of any
sort of understanding, interpretation and ideology about integration. At the same time, they also reveal
the tensions that currently exist in the evolving EU approaches to integration. These frictions become
evident when attempting to relate CBPs 2 and 4.1 with the one on the two-way process paradigm.
These two basic principles undermine any equilibrium between the rights and responsibilities of TCNs
on the one hand, and those of EU citizens on the other. The obligations on the part of immigrants
make integration a one-way process, in which the burdens are not at all shared by EU citizens.
Moreover, the technique for benchmarking integration at the local level shows an even larger and
more varied setting for approaches to and strategies for integration, which do not necessarily match
those pursued at the state or EU levels.174 The activities and programs carried out by some of the local
and regional authorities,175 such as the program advocated by Berlin, tend to favor a social inclusion
and services approach instead of one driven by an immigration-control logic.
4.2 Benchmarking as Neutral Tool?
Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) have pointed out the inherent difficulties in benchmarking stemming
from “the differences in ideological outlook and political priorities”.176 They state that
[d]ifferences between the Member States in their interpretation of ‘integration’ may lead to
different objectives of their integration policies. However, even if every Member State inter-
tinguishes among the following dimensions considered relevant when developing indicators of integration: legal
integration (elimination of legal barriers to integration and the establishment of equal rights for all members of
society), socio-economic integration (equal access to the labor market, access to training and to the housing
market), and socio-cultural integration (“knowledge of language(s) is a key and a powerful vehicle for integra-
tion…language tuition should be an essential part of any integration policy and should be accessible, affordable
and available as soon as possible after the migrants’ arrival”) (see p. 18).
173 S. Pratt, “Immigration, Integration and Citizenship: Latest Developments and the EU’s Role”, in S. Carrera
(ed.), The Nexus between Immigration, Integration and Citizenship in the EU, Collective Conference Volume,
Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, April 2006, pp. 12–15.
174 See EESC, Immigration in the EU and integration policies: Cooperation between regional and local govern-
ments and civil society organizations, SOC/219, Rapporteur: L.M. Pariza Castaños, Brussels, 13 September
2006, particularly Appendix 2 presenting the conclusions of the hearing on immigration and integration coopera-
tion between regional and local governments and civil society organizations, organized by the EESC, the
Generalitat de Catalunya and the Barcelona City Council.
175 Committee of Regions, Local and Regional Authorities and the Immigration Challenge, CoR Studies, Luxem-
bourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Community, December 2005.
176 See p. 5 of Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003).
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preted “integration” in exactly the same way, integration policies would still differ in their ob-
jectives, as the ideal society that governments envisage will not be the same everywhere
and at all times.177 (emphasis added)
There is indeed a strong bias in benchmarking toward a certain ideological setting embracing
what integration means and how it should or should not be deemed successful. There is a lack
of neutrality underlying the entire exercise and wide discretion by whoever is doing the benchmarking
to determine its focus and scope, and to decide how the results are presented. The guiding conceptual
approach and the standards could also shift easily and include any ideological direction. Such a
change in ideology would not, however, prevent the benchmarking from working effectively. Therefore,
benchmarking could end up being instrumentalized to justify any sort of ideology or political tendency
with respect to integration. Furthermore, there is a substantial degree of subjectivity and many value
judgments in the identification of “impediments” or “the preliminary assessment of the situation”,178 the
categorization of favorable (best) or the opposite (worst), the use of the indicators and the way in
which the results are presented. This aspect has been recognized by, for example, the 2005 index:
“The normative framework is, of course, based on certain value judgements. This is necessary to cre-
ate a common framework to score policies. The normative judgements are based on mainstream
arguments in the inclusion discourse about equal treatment and inclusion” [sic].179
Moreover, Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) also highlight that setting a standard for an “ideal integra-
tion process of immigrants is simply impossible given the wide variety of factors influencing
immigration and integration, the immense diversity of migrants and the huge differences in approach
of these matters across the EU”.180 Questions arise about the determination of ‘ideal’, ‘best’ or ‘good’.
What do these terms mean when assessing a policy or how it is implemented? ‘Best’ and ‘ideal’ are
malleable adjectives often attributed according to a certain ideology on ‘the common standard’
against which to test the norm, practice or public authority. What are the highest European com-
mon standards for determining whether a policy can be called the best or worst? What is the precise
content of these common standards? The answer to these questions will equally depend on the read-
ing and interpretation of the alleged standards. As Bruno, Jacquot and Mandin (2006) have argued,
177 Ibid., p. 10.
178 For instance, the 2007 European Parliament study states that the sources from which they derived their “im-
pediments” were inspired, among others, from the technical seminars organized under the auspices of the NCPI
and the European Commission, which is in fact the framework under which the Handbook on Integration for
Practitioners and Policy-Makers is undertaken. The influence of the handbook exercise is also obvious in p. 140
of the report: “Participants at one of the EU Handbook on Integration’s technical seminars recognised the value
of indicators in policy formation, implementation and review. They recommended a cautious use of indicators,
with a warning to avoid a simplification of the integration process into targets for a limited period of time – be-
tween two elections for example.”
179 What they call “mainstream arguments” include for instance R. Süssmuth and W. Weidenfeld (eds), Manag-
ing Integration: The European Union’s Responsibilities towards Immigrants, Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann
Stiftung, 2004; K. Groenendijk, E. Guild and R. Barzilay, Study on the Legal Status of Third-Country Nationals
who are Long-Term Residents in a Member State of the European Union, Centre for Migration Law, Radboud
University of Nijmegen, 2000.
180 See p. 5 of Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003).
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benchmarking is not neutral.181 It needs to be understood as carrying implications for strong political
action through the setting of norms for disciplining national politics, policies and eventually laws. Euro-
pean integration takes place not only through norms, but also on the basis of figures, graphs and
matrices presented as unquestionable, whose nature may actually justify any sort of purported strat-
egy or politics. Concerning the labeling of a practice as best or worst, it is interesting to note that the
2007 European Parliament study states that “[a] government’s lower investment in a particular type of
program may be intentional and therefore would not be judged as a deficiency in need of remedy”.182
Also, the clear-cut attribution of best or worst will be exceptional in practice. In a majority of cases
there will be a wide and blurred range of practices and policies/rules falling between the two extremes,
whose qualification as less or more favorable will depend to an even greater extent on values and
opinion, and not so much on objective and value-free criteria.
4.3 The Personal and Territorial Scope
Another problem associated with benchmarking is the target group and it relates to the ques-
tion of who is an immigrant. Most of the reports presented in Section 3 look at a limited group of
non-EU citizens, i.e. those qualified as legally resident TCNs or ‘newcomers’. What about all the oth-
ers who, while not holding the nationality of a member state, still do not fall within this narrow
category? It seems that the personal scope presented in some of the reports is inspired by that advo-
cated by the European Commission (DG JFS). Yet, the personal scope of integration policies at the
EU level usually does not address the situations of refugees or asylum seekers,183 for instance, or
those deemed irregular immigrants. Also, by solely focusing on legally-residing TCNs, there are under-
lying assumptions that i) it is possible to know and identify who they are, and ii) there is a
homogeneous group of persons who are clearly distinguishable and undoubtedly covered by this con-
structed legal term. The category encompassing TCNs is far from homogeneous, hermetic and static.
TCNs themselves are heterogeneous, diverse and dispersed. Those individuals labeled as TCNs in-
clude nationals from all over the world with widely differing backgrounds, prospects and links with their
countries of nationality and residence.
Furthermore, into what is this group asked to integrate? There appears to be another presumption
about the existence of a ‘host society’ and ‘nation’ that is already well-integrated, cohesive and ho-
181 I. Bruno, S. Jacquot and L. Mandin, “Europeanization through its Instrumentation: Benchmarking, Main-
streaming and the Open Method of Coordination…Toolbox or Pandora’s Box?”, Journal of European Public
Policy, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2006, pp. 519–36; see also I. Bruno, « Généalogie du Benchmarking. Itinéraire d’une
technique de gouvernement », P. Laborier et J. Vogel (dirs.), Les Sciences Camérales. Activités Pratiques et
Histoire des Dispositifs Publics, Paris: PUF, 2007, pp. 97–107.
182 See Neissen and Huddleston (2007).
183 For a study suggesting a set of indicators to assess how far refugee integration for both individuals and com-
munities has been achieved, see A. Ager and A. Strang, Indicators of Integration: Final Report, Home Office
Development and Practice Report, Home Office, London, 2004.
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mogenous. The perception (or rather ideological and political pretension), which also underlies the
two-way process principle, about the existence of two identifiable and distinctive sides (the immigrant
and the nation) is false, and it constitutes one of the core weaknesses in the scope of benchmarking
integration in the EU.
Some of the benchmarking exercises call for the necessity of the member states to collect as much
data as possible about those qualified as ‘naturalized immigrants’ holding the nationality of the state,
but who are still viewed as ‘non-integrated’ (‘foreign citizens’ or ‘nationals with different ethnic origins’).
This call might be blinded by the need to have more statistics for comparison, and it fails to duly take
into account the ethical issues embedded in such an exercise. It needs to be emphasized that within
the context of benchmarking, the collection of data not only serves as a necessary element allowing
for comparison, but as an instrument for ‘monitoring’ or ‘managing’ integration. How can the emer-
gence of a control-oriented logic underlying the collection and storage of ethnic-origin data be
prevented? In addition to the ethical issues this exercise might entail in terms of fundamental rights
and non-discrimination, other questions could be posed: When are these persons no longer going to
be considered immigrants or foreigners, but equal citizens? Is this an issue to be discussed under the
heading of TCNs’ integration? Or is it rather a matter related to social inclusion, social protection and
citizenship?
Moreover, there are questions concerning who/what entity will be the benchmarker. Is it going to be
the EU, the member states or the national and local/regional authorities? There is an implicit danger in
the flexibility surrounding the designation of the benchmarker. If the benchmarking community is
not clearly identified, the member states might see in benchmarking more of an opportunity for evalu-
ating the individual’s performance on integration than comparing and monitoring their own
achievements on social inclusion and social (in)cohesion. This prospect seems more likely in view of
the hesitations expressed by a majority of the EU member states toward evaluating their own policies
and public strategies on immigration, social inclusion and diversity. Projects such as INTI Cities may
come up with interesting results on how to apply the benchmarking technique to appraise the public
services and policies of local authorities, improve their quality and engage with “migrant communities”
on issues of social inclusion.
On this question of who will make up the benchmarking community, what would be the implica-
tions if governments were to take a leading role here? The transfer of benchmarking from the private
to the public sector might facilitate its use in the management of integration or as a coercive manage-
rial approach for disciplining behavior through the norm. A shift in the conceptual and ideological
setting of standards makes benchmarking a dangerous tool of governance. By becoming part of a
state policy, the benchmarking exercise could become a victim of its own purpose and methods. The
continual active involvement of civil society and immigrant organizations in any benchmarking
and evaluation exercise is not only essential for ensuring that their interests and rights are protected
in the processes of policy-making and that no particular ethnic community is stigmatized through the
choice of data for measurement – their involvement is also necessary to help prevent the use of
benchmarking as a technique of governance.
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Concerning the territorial scope, the extent to which a particular practice or policy can at all be con-
sidered ‘best’ across the entire EU is uncertain. Is the technique of benchmarking appropriate for an
EU of 27 member states? When taking into account the lack of a common theoretical and ideological
understanding of integration in EU law, and the difficulties raised as regards the personal scope, it
would be hard to sustain that benchmarking could cope with the diversity and heterogeneity of the
different member states’ histories, public philosophies, legislations and politics about immigration and
diversity. In fact, what might be considered an ‘ideal’ practice in Germany or France could well be-
come the worst when applied in Hungary, Spain or Latvia.184 Few would disagree with the fact that
there are issues and policies that are mostly (or sometimes only) relevant for particular member states
and not for the rest. The problem in this respect is exacerbated when moving to the local and regional
levels.
4.4 The Methodology
4.4.1 Benchmarking and Interdisciplinarity
Most of the benchmarking exercises tend to look at the normative dimension of integration.
They map the legal and policy setting and compare it with other states. Some of the reports have a
prevailing regulatory perspective that at times fails to consider implementation or informal practices
surrounding access and participation. This characteristic is a disciplinary weakness in current
benchmarking techniques. It is no secret that the law says little about how optimally the norms actu-
ally work on the ground in terms of social inclusion. What might initially look favorable, good or best
from a purely legal standpoint could prove inadequate when analyzing how the norm is implemented
and its effectiveness in practice.
Furthermore, the tasks of measuring, monitoring and evaluating social issues from a qualitative
perspective are always challenging. Indeed, from a strictly methodological point of view, the use of
indicators and benchmarking might be easier to apply to a legal exercise, as is the case for checking
whether the laws on family reunification and long-term residence are more or less liberally transposed
in the member states. Still, a purely legal focus is not exempt from further weaknesses either. For ex-
ample, the use of the same indicators to examine the legal framework in the EU-27 will naturally
confront situations in which the national law of some member states does not correspond to the ques-
tions or indicators, or in which the indicator chosen by the benchmarker is not relevant to the law of a
particular state.185 Such incoherence would be all the more prevalent when trying to apply ‘European’
184 See for instance J. Tóth, “Ethnic Citizenship – Can it be obtained and tested?”, 2007 (unpublished manu-
script); see also G.R. De Groot, “A Clarification of the Fundamental Rights Implications of Stateless and Erased
Persons”, Briefing Paper, DG Internal Policies, European Parliament, November 2007.
185 This point is acknowledged in the 2005 index, which states that “the normative judgments are based on
mainstream arguments in the inclusion discourse about equal treatment and inclusion…In some countries, cer-
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indicators on integration to various levels of governance in the EU, such as those practiced by differ-
ent local and regional authorities. Also, by way of illustration, using naturalization as a dimension or
indicator of integration implicitly attributes a certain value to TCNs having access to the nationality of
the nation-state for their inclusion – something that remains open to debate.186 Finally, concerning
issues related to political participation, if we were take as an indicator the existence of consultative
bodies, matters such as whether and how they really operate and the extent to which they truly guar-
antee access should be also addressed.
That notwithstanding, the legal framework often determines the ranking of those member states that
are viewed as performing best or worst according to the chosen standards. For instance, the MIPEX
ranks countries by which is doing better on migrant integration policy. It seems that Latvia, Cyprus,
Austria, Greece and Slovakia are among the worst, while Sweden, Portugal, Belgium and the Nether-
lands are among the best.187 One would expect this ranking to change when moving beyond a purely
legal measurement, but also when looking at the impact, implications and efficacy of these norms and
policies. The legal framework might be perfect, but what actually matters is the way in which it is im-
plemented. This point is particularly important as regards issues of anti-discrimination.
4.4.2 Indicators
The OMC cannot live without benchmarking and the latter cannot survive without a set of homogenous
indicators allowing for the identification of a number of sectoral areas to be assessed. Yet, what ex-
actly do the indicators indicate? What is their function? The indicators are used as a measuring tool to
pinpoint a specific issue related to a policy or law and to examine whether that policy or law is in com-
pliance with the approach set by ‘the ideal standard’. In this respect, we might refer to the 2007
European Parliament study, which acknowledges that it is a normative exercise including “the identifi-
cation of beneficiaries, the choice of what process to measure and a selection and agreement of
benchmarking partners”. The study goes on to state that
[i]ndicators must be designed to facilitate nuanced and reasoned assessments. This use of
indicators becomes even more risky when policy-makers draw general conclusions about
the level of integration in society as a whole. They should make explicit the reasons behind
a choice of certain indicators in order to give context to their meaning in the political de-
tain aspects of the normative framework may not fit with the public philosophy of integration” (Geddes and Nies-
sen, 2005, p. 15).
186 For instance the Council of Europe’s report of 1997 stated that “in reality statements concerning the devel-
opment of naturalization rates over time or comparisons of naturalization rates in various countries are of limited
use when serving as indicators of integration. Can a recent rise in naturalizations really be explained with a
growing inclination to integrate? Or is it the result of the host country’s decision to tolerate dual citizenship when
naturalizing foreigners? In other words: changing naturalization requirements can have an influence on naturali-
zation rates. But does it influence the individual’s degree of integration?” (Council of Europe, Measurement and
Indicators of Integration, Community Relations, Directorate of Social and Economic Affairs, Strasbourg: Council
of Europe Publishing, 1997, p. 12).
187 See p. 3 of the MIPEX report (Niessen, Huddleston and Citron, 2007).
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bate. Subordinating indicators to perceptions in public debates causes serious conse-
quences for integration.188
Indeed, the use of indicators is not straightforward from a methodological point of view.189 As recog-
nized by an INTI research project funded by the Commission, “indicators are not ‘aseptic’ tools.
Indicators also reflect different approaches and integration models; they reflect different elements,
areas and priority actions.”190 In light of the reports reviewed in Section 3, considerable diversity is
likely to be encountered when identifying, classifying, selecting and constructing a list of indi-
cators at the various levels of governance in the EU. This heterogeneity increases substantially
when bringing into the picture indicators developed by and for local authorities.
The challenging task of agreeing on a common set of indicators at the EU level would become even
more complicated when attempting to develop a comprehensive and coherent system of indicators at
national, local and regional levels across the member states. Moreover, assuming that these dilem-
mas are successfully overcome, the question then arises about how these indicators would be
used to conduct a qualitative and quantitative evaluation in a reliable and accurate manner.
What would be the units and sources of measurement? Would all the indicators have the same ‘value’
and relevance when benchmarking integration? Would the indicators measure integration or social
exclusion? For instance, how would the attitude toward basic rules, norms and shared values of the
receiving country be measured? Would these indicators be based on facts or perceived wisdom?
Would they constitute reliable instruments? Concerning the ambiguity involved in the use of indicators,
Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) have said that
[m]ore ambiguities can be distinguished in other potential indicators. In fact, such ambigui-
ties reflect differences in policy objectives and contradictions between the course of
integration processes in different domains. An integration policy that aims implicitly or even
explicitly at assimilation will define its objectives in terms that are quite different from those
of a policy that aims at recognizing and facilitating migrant cultures; they may still use the
same indicators, but, when it comes to interpreting the effects of their efforts, they may
draw opposite conclusions.191
A similar critical stance was taken by the Council of Europe (1997):
188 See pp. 142–46 of Niessen and Huddleston (2007).
189 This was for instance acknowledged by the report of C. Withol De Wenden et al. (2008), which stated on sev-
eral occasions that most of the indicators used by the project were ambiguous and thus vague for a clear
presentation of the situation. It was also stressed that the results of such research should be taken with caution,
as they represent an indicative value in measuring the phenomenon rather than an exhaustive objective meas-
ure. See for instance pp. 7, 41, 43, 46 and 59 of the report.
190 INTI-Project 13 Indicators on Immigrant Integration (June 2005–June 2006), Immigrant Integration Indicators:
Proposal for Contributions to the Formulation of a System of Common Integration Indicators, Research & Docu-
mentation Centre (WODC), Ministry of Justice, The Hague, 2006, p. 14 (retrieved from
http://english.wodc.nl/publicaties).
191 See Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003), p. 41.
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Apart from language skills, which are relatively easy to evaluate, it seems almost impossi-
ble to find indicators for cultural integration everybody can agree with. The problem starts
with the term itself: [W]hat exactly is ‘culture’? Religion? Music? Cooking? It continues with
the difficulties…what exactly is meant by cultural integration? Giving up one’s folk songs or
being tolerated [by] the majority culture?192
The same Council of Europe report echoed these concerns about using indicators in areas such as
“political participation” or social integration, while it notes that “statements concerning the migrants’
social integration are often limited to speculations”. The report continued:
Bearing these problems in mind it becomes rather doubtful whether the identification of
indicators and the measurement of integration based on these indicators can be a fruitful
undertaking at all. It is questionable whether one can succeed in reliably identifying a set
of indicators really pointing at progress in integration…and covering all dimensions of in-
tegration at the same time in order to supply a complete impression of the state of
integration in a given country.193
In addition, one of the reports analyzed in Section 3 refers to issues connected with the respect of
‘shared values’ as a possible indicator for cultural integration. Although what constitutes a value re-
mains a contested matter, tackling the question of ‘European values’ poses even greater dilemmas
and divisions. Who would be in a position to define the meaning of a European citizen’s values and
way of life? What does it mean to be European? And what would be the features and distinctive ingre-
dients of a supposed European set of values? These questions of definition would be difficult to
reconcile in view of the rich diversity reigning in an enlarged EU. The task of conceptualizing the con-
tent of European identity involves an even greater process of excluding what it does not mean to be
European. The legal category of non-European would be reinforced and perhaps end up using the
same archaic stereotypes and societal/cultural/religious visions of what it means to be (or not) a
‘model European citizen’. Indeed, the Europeanisation of a common set of values into which TCNs
would be expected to integrate would open an even wider debate than that solely focused on the na-
tional levels. Such an exercise would unleash ever-greater contradictions and paradoxes, and
deconstruct certain illusions and premises upon which the EU has been built.194
4.4.3 Typology and Comparison
The system of indicators aims at facilitating comparison between states’ integration policies and laws.
Any typology or comparative exercise tends to fall into the trap of over-simplifying social reali-
ties. This occurs through the effort to make the comparison understandable and coherent.
192 Council of Europe, Measurement and Indicators of Integration, Community Relations, Directorate of Social
and Economic Affairs, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1997.
193 Ibid., p. 13.
194 E. Balibar, Nous, citoyens d’Europe? Les Frontiers, L’État, le peuple, Paris: La D´couvert. 2001.
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Benchmarking is based on the premise that a comparative study can in fact be effectively conducted
among states and that the results from this comparison will be comprehensive enough to inform and
promote better policy-making at the EU level. There have been numerous attempts to look for similari-
ties, differences and trends among the EU member states in the academic literature and the studies
addressed in Section 3.195 One major difficulty is always that of finding any comparable
data/categories of information on integration that go beyond the mere legal and policy frameworks
(and stereotypes) about national models of integration.196 As Penninx et al. (2008) have expressed,
[c]ross-national comparability of seemingly simple data such as those on migration turn out
to be profoundly problematic. The problem is that administrative data are collected within a
specific institutional context for specific purposes, using definitions that reflect their particu-
lar tasks, assumptions and preoccupations…the basic problem for scientists in using such
data for comparative purposes [is] twofold: do they measure the same phenomenon and
are they complete and representative?197
Indeed, gathering objective and reliable data about access and participation in socio-economic
dimensions might be a rather daunting task if the main sources are limited to surveys, opinion
polls, personal contacts/relationships and research on attitudes.198 This problem intensifies in relation
to accessing any information connected with what some term ‘cultural integration’. Therefore, the
195 See for instance the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), Integration Agreements
and Voluntary Measures: Compulsory or Voluntary Nature – Comparison of Compulsory Integration Courses,
Programs and Agreements and Voluntary Integration Programs and Measures in Austria, France, Germany, the
Netherlands and Switzerland, ICMPD, Vienna, May 2005; I. Michalowski, An Overview on Introduction Programs
for Immigrants in Seven European Member States, Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, The Hague,
2004; S. Carrera, “A Typology of Different Integration Programs in the EU”, Briefing Paper, DG Internal Policies,
European Parliament, January 2006(d); S. Carrera, A Comparison of Integration Programs in the EU: Trends
and Weaknesses, CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 1, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2006(c);
and C. Joppke, “Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe”, West
European Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 2007, pp. 1–22.
196 INTI-Project 13 Indicators on Immigrant Integration (June 2005–June 2006), Immigrant Integration Indicators:
Proposal for Contributions to the Formulation of a System of Common Integration Indicators, Research & Docu-
mentation Centre (WODC), Ministry of Justice, The Hague, 2006 (retrieved from
http://english.wodc.nl/publicaties). The report concluded by stating that “[t]he lack of comparable statistics, differ-
ent policies and models in Europe in the field of immigration and integration remain obstacles for the successful
development of comparative data and indicators across Europe”. For a summary of the project, see European
Commission, INTI Report: Integration of Third-Country Nationals, 2003-2004 Projects, DG Justice, Freedom and
Security, Brussels, June 2006. A similar argument was sustained by the Commissioner for Integration and Mi-
gration of the Senate of Berlin (ed.), Encouraging Diversity – Strengthening Cohesion, Integration Policy in Berlin
2007-2011, Der Beauftragte für Integration und Migration, Berlin, 2007.
197 R. Penninx, D. Spencer and N. Van Her, Migration and Integration in Europe: The State of Research, ESRC
Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford, 2008 (retrieved from
www.norface.org).
198 For one such attempt, see D. De Palo, R. Faini and A. Venturini, The Social Assimilation of Immigrants, IZA
Discussion Paper Series No. 2439, Institute for the Study of Labour, Bonn, November 2006, which aims at
“studying the extent of social relations of migrants and compar[ing] it with that of natives” (p. 7) utilising the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which is a multi-country longitudinal survey based on a stan-
dardized questionnaire. For another report using a similar survey-based methodology, see O. Causa and S.
Jean, Integration of Immigrants in OECD Countries: Do Policies Matter?, Economic Department Working Papers
No. 564, OECD, Paris, 2007 (retrieved from www.oecd.org/eco).
Benchmarking Integration in the EU | Page 56
question arises as to whether integration-related figures and statistical data could be sufficiently trust-
worthy and comparable for undertaking such a monitoring exercise.
4.4.4 Results of Benchmarking Integration
What is the nature of the results? Are the results robust and fact-based? Benchmarking uses non-
transparent, complex and obscure methods and tools. It becomes a numeric matching exercise
most often using quantitative indicators or starting with qualitative ones and then presenting them in a
resolutely quantitative fashion. This method allows for rather complex yet incomprehensive analyses
that are alien to a scientific assessment of effectiveness and usefulness. Any attempt to understand
how some of the benchmarking exercises have been constructed or work becomes a ‘mission impos-
sible’, even for experts in immigration and inclusion.
Although some of the benchmarking reports discussed in Section 3 have involved experts and aca-
demics in the preliminary phases, these contributors have not always been involved in the
achievement and presentation of the results. The character of the benchmarking outcomes is beyond
any comprehensive scientific evaluation. The methodology pursued by the 2005 index, for example, is
far from transparent. It is typified by an opaque style that obscures any clear vision of the way it really
works or how the results have been attained.199 This format prevents possible challenges to or ques-
tions about its adequacy and the validity of its results. In its technical rhetoric, everything becomes
numbers and has to be quantified or quantifiable. The index thus becomes an instrument based on
graphs and statistics, with a view to presenting a respectable scientific image that is hard to confront.
There appears to be a strategy to use benchmarking in an irrefutable and highly technical
manner to portray some results whose bases would otherwise be subject to debate.
For example, the 2005 and 2007 versions of the MIPEX use “averages” and “indices” to present the
final results. Understanding the ways in which the different classes of averages have been measured
and calculated is an extremely complicated task on its own. The methodology backing up the synthe-
sized results is far from simple or user-friendly. In addition, the concluding results are presented in bar
graphs and radar graphs in an attempt “to provide the clearest statement of a country’s performance
on policy relative to our normative framework”,200 but which actually manage to hide very effectively
199 A good example is footnote 11 of the index (Geddes and Niessen, 2005): “The criterion used for this analysis
is: two country outcomes are significantly different if the difference is equal to a difference caused by an average
score difference of 1 for one of their sets. There is, however, one complication, because the strand means are
calculated as the average of all indicator values belonging to the strand and not as the average of the four di-
mension means per strand, a dimension difference of 1 score point therefore has a different weight (more
indicators means more weight) depending on the table. In defining significant difference the model is used that
approximates the strand mean by working with the mean of four dimension values per strand. There are 4 di-
mensions per strand. Therefore, the criterion effect on a strand mean is 0.25. There are 20 dimensions per
country (5 strands of 4 dimensions); therefore the criterion effect on a country mean is 0.05. In conclusion: two
countries have a significant mean difference if two respective strand means differ more than 0.25. Two countries
have a significant country mean difference if the respective means differ more than 0.05. Two countries have a
significant country index difference if their country index differs more than 2.5 points.”
200 Ibid., p. 41.
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the real process through which the evaluation has been conducted. Some of the reports end up using
the same kinds of tools (graphs and statistics) and methods as those utilized by public authorities to
justify the implementation of restrictive immigration policies.
4.5 Europeanizing Policies on Integration
Is benchmarking the best way to foster Europeanization in the area of TCN integration? While the
comparative exercise appears to be one of the main goals of benchmarking, the final aim is for it to
lead to a ‘learning experience’ through the exchange of practices and coordination based on ‘Euro-
pean standards’, in which the EU has an impact on the national level. If a member state is found at the
bottom of the ranking on ‘best practices’ or is deemed to demonstrate ‘worst practices’ in relation to a
given standard, benchmarking encourages change and policy convergence, through means other than
those provided by the Community method. Yet, consideration should be given to the possibility that
the opposite might occur as well: through the exchange of information under the EU framework on
integration, some national practices might be emphasized and transferred to the supranational setting,
thus becoming ‘European standards’. 
The EU framework on integration constitutes a pragmatic alternative to the Community method. It
aims at facilitating coordination and promoting best practices among the member states through other
means. It seeks to ‘softly’ influence national policies and laws. In fact, while these methods have been
conceived as a soft legal approach, they may not prove to be so soft and may affect the policy frame-
works at the domestic level (policy convergence).201 As recognized in the European Commission’s
Third Annual Report on Migration and Integration (COM(2007) 512) of 11 September 2007,202 the
CBPs have already been expressly mentioned in official declarations and political statements in coun-
tries such as Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Spain. In addition, Spain has explicitly
incorporated them into the Spanish Strategic Plan on Citizenship and Integration.203
Moreover, the legislative outcomes are not the typical regulations, directives or decisions, but rather
communications, annual reports, Commission staff working documents, handbooks, common agen-
das, etc., whose juridical nature and effects are far from clearly stipulated or commonly agreed, thus
affecting the principles of legal certainty and transparency. These acts fall under the heading of soft
201 M. López Santana, “The Domestic Implications of European Soft-Law: Framing and Transmitting Change in
Employment Policy”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 4, June 2006, pp. 481–99.
202 Commission Communication, Third Annual Report on Migration and Integration, COM(2007)512, Brussels, 11
September 2007.
203 Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración, Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, DG de
Integración de Inmigrantes, Junio 2006; see also L. Cachón, “El Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración
2007-2010”, en E. Aja y J. Arango (eds), La Inmigración en España en 2006, Anuario de Inmigración y Políticas
de Inmigración, Barcelona: CIDOB Publicacions, 2007, pp. 246–66.
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law as they lack any legally binding force,204 and in this way their legal effects differ greatly from those
of ordinary EU law. The EU framework on integration has not envisaged any kind of enforcement
mechanism to guarantee that the member states actually comply with the CBPs. It is up to the mem-
ber states whether or not to take on board the common agenda on integration. Therefore, although
soft law might help to achieve more uniformity (Europeanization) in the application of the law while
allowing for a high degree of “differentiation”,205 the question remains open as to how its use can really
ensure a solid common policy and prevent the soft regulatory instruments from losing their transna-
tional significance, coherency and consistency during implementation in the various national arenas.206
In moving the debate on benchmarking integration to the role that it might play in evaluating the per-
formance of local and regional authorities, a somewhat different scenario emerges. The ‘integrating
cities process’ aims at fostering the dialogue and exchange of experiences among cities on the rela-
tionship between the EU framework on integration and the local dimension. In doing so, this initiative
intends to promote innovative models of integration governance by local authorities across the EU. In
this context, the added value of EU initiatives and supranational networks is the support they
could give toward developing better standards and quality in service provision, local policies
and institutional structures.
5 Refocusing the Debate on Benchmarking and its Potential to Fos-
ter Social Inclusion
This chapter outlines seven key areas in which benchmarking (and the debate surrounding it) could be
enhanced by realigning some underlying concepts and tackling issues embedded in the benchmarking
methodology.
1. Strengthen the traditional European approach(es) to integration. One of the key deficits
connected with benchmarking is the lack of a commonly shared approach to or ‘standard’ for in-
tegration at the EU level. The CBPs are too broad and flexible in nature to give any concise definition
or ideological setting. We have also identified a shift in the paradigm driving the classical normative
understanding or features attributed to integration in the EU. The paradigm has moved from one ad-
vocating fair and near-equality treatment to another conceiving integration as a legal measure or
204 F. Snyder, “Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community”, in S. Martin (ed.), The Construc-
tion of Europe: Essays in Honour of Emile Noël, Dordecht: Kluwer, 1994, pp. 197–225; see also L. Senden, Soft
Law in European Community Law: Its Relationship to Legislation, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2003.
205 L. Senden and S. Prechal, “Differentiation in and through Community Soft-Law”, in B. de Witte, D. Hanf and
E. Vos (eds), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2001, pp. 181–99.
206 The potential of the EIF in this regard cannot be underestimated. The combination of soft law and a strong
financial framework might constitute an effective mechanism to ensure that only those national policies and pro-
grams in full compliance with the common objectives (CBPs) that are settled upon will be funded. The funding
scheme would therefore enforce the consistency of a common policy approach.
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condition applying within or outside the EU (the immigration norm) in order for TCNs to have access to
rights, security and social inclusion. All this makes the conceptual weaknesses difficult to overcome at
the EU level.
2. Deconstruct the nexus between integration and immigration in EU law/policy. The way in
which integration is being framed at the EU level in immigration law and as part of the AFSJ is prob-
lematic for benchmarking. The linking of integration and immigration in EU law/policy is taken as an
unquestionable premise at the EU and national official levels, and it is even qualified as best practice
in the EU framework on integration. This nexus, however, leads to the stigmatization of a vulnerable
foreigner who depends on social solidarity and seeks inclusion, but who is prevented by immigration
law from having access to security and rights. Integration measures and conditions in EU immigration
law and the EU framework on integration contribute to social exclusion and (in)cohesion, as they are
used to test whether an individual deserves a secure immigrant status based on that individual already
having attained the necessary degree of social inclusion. Paradoxically, while those individuals holding
an insecure immigration status would need more rights and protection, the use of integration as a
norm prevents them from being socially included and acts as a mechanism for their exclusion.
When benchmarking is combined with the allusion to mandatory integration programs, conditions or
measures, integration abroad or pre-departure measures, welcoming programs, national plans for
citizenship, civic introduction or orientation courses, the tensions coming out of the nexus between
immigration and integration are likely to be exacerbated. There is nothing to prevent benchmarking
from being used to attribute an (assumed to be) irrefutable ‘value’ to certain state practices, programs
and political strategies. If careful attention is not paid in establishing a European benchmarking system
on integration, there is a danger that it will become another instrument in the hands of public au-
thorities for legitimizing restrictive immigration laws and practices. The intersection between
integration and the legal and policy framework on the management of immigration obstructs the reali-
zation of the citizens-based approach and the Tampere paradigm on fair and near-equality treatment,
as well as the development of the two-way process.
3. Build up the connection between integration and social inclusion in EU policy. There
needs to be a stronger link between the policy spheres of integration and social inclusion at the EU
level. The spotlight should be on what the obstacles and barriers are to the social inclusion of vulner-
able groups in society and on providing measures to facilitate access across all the sectors in the
receiving society and different levels of governance in the EU. In the past few years, the relationships
between the DG JFS and other DGs, such as those for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Oppor-
tunities, have not proven to be simple and straightforward. One of the main legislative outcomes of
inter-DG cooperation on integration has been the adoption of the Communication on Immigration, In-
tegration and Employment (COM(2003)336), although that was back in June 2003.207
207 Communication from the Commission on Immigration, Integration and Employment, COM(2003) 336, Brus-
sels, 3 June 2003.
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4. Address the lack of neutrality. Benchmarking is not a neutral or ideology-free tool, but rather
encompasses heavy political baggage. How can the independence and objectivity of this technique be
ensured? What are the guarantees that it will not become another tool of governance in the hands of
public authorities to manage immigration and diversity? Moreover, what are the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ prac-
tices? ‘Best’, ‘favorable’ or ‘worst’ are malleable adjectives often attributed according to a certain
ideological understanding or approach to ‘the common standard’ against which to test the norm, policy
or practice at stake.
5. Consider the issue of who is the benchmarker and who is to be benchmarked. It is not
clear who will be in the position of benchmarker. How certain is it that the benchmarking community on
integration will be open, plural and diverse at the EU level? How can independence be safeguarded?
Is it realistic to believe that throughout the different phases making up the benchmarking process, the
interests and involvement of civil society, social partners and immigrants’ organizations will be duly
protected? Or will it become another apparatus in hands of state authorities and the European Com-
mission (DG JFS)? There is also the important problem of who is addressed in the personal scope of
benchmarking. Most of the reports studied in Section 3 only cover legally resident TCNs. This narrow
approach originates in the focus on immigration control that has been applied to integration in the con-
text of the EU framework on integration and the AFSJ.
6. Examine the methodologies. Current benchmarking techniques are encumbered by various
methodological defects that call for critical reflection and wide discussion. As argued in Section 4,
there are numerous constraints involved in attempting to apply an interdisciplinary approach, finding a
common set of indicators, resolving the shortcomings rooted in any comparative analysis and present-
ing the benchmarking results in a transparent and comprehensive manner. Benchmarking rhetoric
appears to take for granted that these deficiencies do not exist. At the same time, improving all these
weaknesses might well raise ethical issues with respect to non-discrimination and fundamental rights,
which must not be undercut by a short-sighted drive for data for the purpose of comparing and moni-
toring integration in the EU. Also, while one of the goals of benchmarking is the identification of good
or best practices, it would be desirable to first address whether the technique itself is good or bad – an
issue that until now has received little serious attention. The discussion could move beyond providing
plausible answers to the questions of ‘what exists’ (a mapping exercise) and ‘what could be’ (policy
recommendations) in relation to integration policies and regulations in the EU. The debate could in-
stead focus on the question of ‘what should be’ (thus deconstructing the benchmarking of
integration). Such a shift in focus would be the most appropriate way to move the debate on bench-
marking integration in the EU forward.
7. Europeanize the integration efforts currently being undertaken through soft law. Doubts
have also been aired about whether benchmarking really is a better way to foster policy convergence
on the integration of TCNs in the EU framework on integration. The Treaty of Lisbon, however, would
offer the basis for developing common legislative measures to encourage and support the work of the
member states in this area through the new Article 79.4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union
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(TFU). As such, it would formalize the current quasi-OMC in the EU framework on integration through
the application of the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision).208
6 Set of Policy Recommendations
1. Revitalize the Tampere approach to integration. Before developing EU immigration law and
the EU framework on integration any further, deep reflection is needed on the European ap-
proach(es) to integration. The Tampere Program should be revitalized and the paradigm on fair and
near-equality treatment put back on the EU’s agenda. The two-way process paradigm is proving insuf-
ficient to prevent the sole application of burdens and obligations to TCNs in the form of immigration
norms. Furthermore, the potential offered by a legally-binding Charter of Fundamental Rights for the
liberalization of European citizenship for TCNs should be further explored.209
2. Develop and strengthen the nexus between integration and social inclusion. The integra-
tion debate needs to be disentangled from (in)security and immigration control and linked to
social inclusion. The use of integration as a mandatory criterion to limit the legal channels of regular
migration is neither consistent with the way the EU has dealt with mobility and integration, nor is it co-
herent with the EU’s new motto – ‘united in diversity’. The aspiration of some member states to limit
the EU’s competence over immigration by using the subjective condition of integration and to restrict
the latter to the confines of their own legislation is counterproductive to the political project of a com-
mon EU immigration policy. Also, diversity is one of the EU’s strengths, not a defect in need of
correction.210 Social inclusion in the member states depends on an understanding of integration as a
right for TCNs to equality and participation rather than an obligation to abandon their identity(ies).211
The ‘integrating cities process’ is a positive initiative in this respect, which should be further promoted.
Strengthening the voice of the cities in the elaboration of the EU framework on integration is
208 Article 79.4 states that “[t]he European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States
with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States”. See also S. Carrera and F. Geyer, “The Re-
form Treaty and Justice and Home Affairs: Implications for the Common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”,
in E. Guild and F. Geyer (eds), Security versus Justice? Police and Judicial Cooperation in the European Union,
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008, pp. 289–307.
209 The Charter recognizes fundamental rights not only in relation to European citizens, but also to TCNs legally
residing in the EU. See the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007/C 303/01, OJ C303/01,
14.12.2007; see also D. Kostakopoulou, “European Citizenship: Writing the Future”, European Law Journal,
Special Issue on EU Citizenship, Vol. 13, No. 5, 2007, pp. 623–46.
210 D. Bigo, S. Carrera and E. Guild, What Future for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? Recommenda-
tions on EU Migration and Border Policies in a Globalizing World, CEPS Policy Brief No. 156, Centre for
European Policy Studies, Brussels, March 2008.
211 D. Bigo, S. Carrera, E. Guild and R.B.J. Walter, The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security:
Mid-Term Report on the Results of the CHALLENGE Project, CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 4, Centre for
European Policy Studies, Brussels, February 2007 (see p. 21).
Benchmarking Integration in the EU | Page 62
essential for articulating a common European approach, guided by principles of social inclu-
sion and the reliable provision of public services.
3. Deemphasize questionable national practices. The European integration strategy should
not continue to provide a supranational forum for highlighting certain policies, programs and
practices at the national level considered ‘best’ by some, and therefore deemed a source of inspira-
tion for the entire EU-27. The direct consequence of current actions such as the exchange of
information is that the strategies and techniques practiced by certain member states may eclipse
those of countries perceived as ‘less experienced’. ‘Lessons learned’ and ‘best practices’ in one mem-
ber state may translate into worse practices in another. The EIF should not be instrumentalized to
promote the normative framing of integration as a tool for immigration control and a restrictive immi-
gration policy in the EU-27. Nor should the EU support questionable national practices that seek to
manage (or rather limit) the immigration, security of residence, access to rights and family life of
TCNs.
4. Undertake a critical assessment of benchmarking. If the EU takes over or nuances a proper
debate about the inherent defects involved in benchmarking integration and legitimizes its use regard-
less of whether this supranational technique of governance is truly necessary, effective or desirable,
then all the weaknesses identified should be carefully studied and tackled. Furthermore, another (wel-
come) step would be that of addressing the state practices and policies under development that
prevent, condition, limit or undermine social inclusion and protection. The relationship between these
practices and the European employment, social inclusion and social protection strategies also merits
attention. These steps could in turn lead to measuring social exclusion and determining how to
improve the provision of public services that foster inclusion, along with legal security and ac-
cess to rights by TCNs and other vulnerable groups.
5. Consolidate the policy linkages within the European Commission. The DG JFS should work
very closely and interact more decisively with other related DGs, such as those for Employment, So-
cial Affairs and Equal Opportunities and Education. The need to strengthen the “mainstreaming
approach” of the EU framework for integration has also been underlined by the Commission Commu-
nication on a Common Immigration Policy for Europe (COM(2008)359) of 17 June 2008.212 This effort
should not remain a merely symbolic one on the part of the Commission services.213 It should instead
encourage the development of a nexus that fosters coherent policy. This nexus is of the utmost
importance for a robust European approach to integration and a potential OMC on integration driven
212 In particular, the Communication calls for “strengthening further the mainstreaming approach of the EU
Framework for Integration including civic participation, integration into the labour market, social inclusion, anti-
discrimination, equal opportunities, education and youth-related measures, intercultural dialogue and diversity
management” (see p. 6 of the Communication).
213 See point 3.2 of the Commission Communication, Third Annual Report on Migration and Integration,
COM(2007)512, Brussels, 11 September 2007, on “mainstreaming integration” across a wide range of EU poli-
cies such as employment, social inclusion/social protection, education, health, urban dimension, intercultural
dialogue, fundamental rights, non-discrimination and equal opportunities, women, children, youth and entrepre-
neurs (see pp. 5-7).
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by the principles of social inclusion, equality and dignity. It would also help to prevent any overlapping
OMC scenarios in these policy areas within the Commission. A permanent inter-DG working group
including members of each of the European Commission’s services dealing with the various aspects
of immigration should be set up for this purpose.
6. Establish an appropriate and inclusive personal scope for the application of policy. The
fair and near-equality treatment of all persons not holding the nationality of a member state
should be duly addressed along with issues related to access and participation. Furthermore,
every person holding national and therefore European citizenship should be treated equally and in a
non-discriminatory manner according to EU law and the Treaties. Any perceived obstacles and barri-
ers to the inclusion and protection of EU citizens should mainly be dealt with through the provisions for
social inclusion, social protection, fundamental rights and non-discrimination.
7. Ensure and increase the involvement of relevant actors: Civil society, social partners and
academia. The decision-making processes in the quasi-OMC on integration should be further liberal-
ized, with proper democratic control of over action as well as the vigorous participation of civil society,
social partners and academia. It would be particularly important to guarantee that actors such as civil
society and immigrants’ organizations are actively involved, not only in the initial phases of any
potential OMC on integration and a European benchmarking system, but also in evaluating the accu-
racy and reliability of the indicators, data sources and the comprehensiveness of the results of any
benchmarking exercise. The forthcoming European integration forum offers great potential in this
regard.
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ANNEX 2
MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FRAMING OF INTEGRATION IN EU LAW AND POLICY (1999–2008)214
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM
Tampere Program,
15–16 October 1999
European Council - (*) EC fair and near-equal treatment paradigm:
1) Principle of fair treatment for legally-residing TCNs
2) More vigorous integration policy granting to legal TCN rights and obligations
comparable to EU citizens
3) The granting of rights that are “as near as possible” to those of EU citizens to
long-term residents
Communication on a
Community Immigration
Policy, COM(2000) 757
of 22 November 2000
European Commission - (=) EC fair and near-equal treatment paradigm
- (*) “Successful integration policies” should start “as soon as possible after admis-
sion” and “settlement packages”
- (*) Explicit reference to integration as a two-way process
- (*) Obligations: TCNs need to adapt to “our fundamental shared principles and val-
ues”
- (*) Civic citizenship
Justice, Home Affairs
and Civil Protection
Conclusions, 14–15 Oc-
tober 2002
Council - Integration is an “important element in the establishment of a European asylum and
immigration policy, which could include integration requirements”
- Newly arrived immigrants should have access to information “on their host society”
and language courses in accordance with national law
214 The table uses the (*) symbol when pointing out features of a key innovative nature and (=) when alluding to those already part of previous normative
responses.
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Opinion on Immigration,
Integration and the Role
of Civil Society Organi-
zations, SOC/075, 21
March 2002
EESC - (*) “A Community Framework Program to Promote the Social Integration of Immi-
grants and Refugees. The program should spur the other institutions to step up their
integration policies at all levels.”
- Civic citizenship – “bringing immigrants' rights and duties, as well as access to
goods, services and means of civic participation progressively into line with those of
the rest of the population, under conditions of equal opportunities and treatment”
Communication on Im-
migration, Integration
and Employment,
COM(2003) 336, 3 June
2003
European Commission - (=) The EC fair and near-equal treatment paradigm
- Two-way process principle
- (*) Obligations: “immigrants respect the fundamental norms and values of the host
society and participate actively in the integration process”
- (*) Holistic approach: “not only the economic and social aspects of integration, but
also issues related to cultural and religious diversity, citizenship, participation and
political rights”
- Nexus between employment and integration (economic rationale)
Report on the Commis-
sion Communication on
an open method of co-
ordination for the
Community immigration
policy, C5-0337/2002 –
2002/2181(COS), A5-
0224/2003, 16 June
2003
European Parliament - (*) “Active Policy on Integration”: first, clear rules on the legal status of TCN resi-
dents and their right to good administration; second, integration into the labor
market; third, tuition in the national language and access to education; fourth, ac-
cess to social and health services; fifth, dignified living conditions in cities and
neighborhoods
- (=) Civic citizenship
- (*) “Member States should not misuse integration policy as a way of rendering immi-
gration impossible in practice”; calls on member states not to impose integration
tests and language requirements which immigrants are required to comply with be-
fore they enter a member state.
Thessaloniki Presidency
Conclusions
19–20 June 2003
European Council - (=) Nexus between employment and integration: EU integration policy necessary to
deal with “the new economic and demographic challenges that the EU is now facing”
- Two-way process
- (*) Call for the development of “common basic principles for integration of immi-
grants”
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Directive 2003/86 on the
right to family reunifica-
tion, 22 September 2003
Council - Integration as a condition – Article 4.1
- Integration as a measure abroad – Article 7.2
Directive 2003/109 on
the status of third-
country nationals who
are long-term residents,
25 November 2003
Council - Integration as a condition – Article 5.2
- Integration as a measure – Article 15.3
Report on the Commu-
nication from the
Commission on Immi-
gration, Integration and
Employment,
2003/2147(INI), A5-
0445/2003, 1 December
2003
European Parliament - (*) Personal scope: “new migrants, established third-country nationals and EU citi-
zens of ethnic minority origin” and “third-generation migrants”
- (*) Integration as a factor for “social cohesion” and “social inclusion”
- Implicit two-way process principle – “integration is a matter for society as a whole,
and…efforts are needed both from migrants and from indigenous populations in or-
der to achieve genuine social cohesion”
- (*) Language skills – duty to follow courses in the national language or languages
- (=) “Active Policy on Integration”: first, clear rules on the legal status of TCN resi-
dents and their right to good administration; second, integration into the labor
market; third, duty to follow courses in the national language and the right to access
education; fourth, access to social and health services; fifth, dignified living condi-
tions in cities and neighborhoods; sixth, participation in social, cultural and political
life
- (*) Integration programs for newcomers
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Communication, First
Annual Report on Migra-
tion and Integration,
COM(2004) 508, 16 July
2004
European Commission - (*) Trends in national policies on integration:
1) Integration courses and programs. “A number of Member States are in the proc-
ess of developing specific integration courses or programs targeted at immigrants
and refugees and there is a growing understanding of the need to mainstream
immigration aspects into all policies and to mobilise stakeholders”
2) Shared concern as regards the integration of “the newly arrived”, and ensuring
that they “understand and respect the fundamental norms and values of the host
society (civic education)”, including “language abilities (language tuition)”
- (*) Holistic approach and civic education: “such (Member States’) efforts could be
seen as an increased recognition of the need for developing and implementing a ho-
listic approach to integration, which should include measures to facilitate civic,
cultural and political participation”
- (*) Implicit nexus between integration and admission
Handbook on Integration
for Policy-Makers and
Practitioners, November
2004
Migration Policy Group
(on behalf of the Euro-
pean Commission) and
NCPI
- (*) Introduction of courses and programs for newly arrived TCNs and civic participa-
tion
- (*) Integration as self-sufficiency and independence: “governments seek to enable
immigrants to lead an independent life concerning housing, jobs, education, social
networks and participation in society”
- (=) Two-way process principle
- Introduction to “values” to meet the standards set by the countries’ norms and rules
- (*) Linkage between “positive outcomes” with the development of “certain skills” such
as language proficiency and knowledge of the host society; integration programs “are
an investment for the future, which both the immigrant and the society should be will-
ing to make. They give immigrants a start enabling them to acquire vital skills to
become self-sufficient and are therefore well worth the effort. The return on invest-
ment for society is that immigrants become better-equipped citizens capable of
contributing to society” (see the annex of the handbook).
- (*) Integration indicators, indexing and benchmarking
Benchmarking Integration in the EU | Page 77
The Hague Program,
4–5 November 2004
European Council - “[C]ommon basic principles underlying a coherent framework on integration”
Justice and Home Af-
fairs Conclusions, 19
November 2004
Council The 11 common basic principles for immigrant integration policy (CBPs)
1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immi-
grants and residents of member states.
2. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the EU.
3. Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participa-
tion of immigrants.
4. 1) Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions is indis-
pensable for integration; 2) enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is
essential to successful integration.
5. Efforts in education are critical for preparing immigrants, and particularly their de-
scendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society.
6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and
services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a
critical foundation for better integration.
7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and member state citizens is a funda-
mental mechanism for integration. Shared fora, intercultural dialogue, education
about immigrants and immigrants’ culture and stimulating living conditions in urban
environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and member states’
citizens.
8. 1) The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of
Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, 2) unless such practices conflict
with other inviolable European rights or national law.
9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of
integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, support their inte-
gration.
10. Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios,
levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public-
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policy formation and implementation.
11. Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to
adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of infor-
mation more effective.
Report on the Links be-
tween Legal and Illegal
Migration and Integra-
tion of Migrants,
2004/2137(INI),
A6/0136/2005, 3 May
2005
European Parliament - (*) Language, civic courses and introduction programs, “encouraging efforts to learn
the language of the host society and encouraging the organisation of civic courses
and teaching programs on topics including male/female equality”
- (*) Respect of the EU’s fundamental values “by a symbolic act of commitment”
- (=) Implicit two-way process principle
- (=) “Active Policy on Integration”: first, clear rules on the legal status of TCN residents
and their right to good administration; second, integration into the labor market; third,
duty to follow courses in the national language and the right to access education;
fourth, access to social and health services; fifth, decent living conditions in cities and
neighborhoods; sixth, participation in social, cultural and political life
Communication on a
Common Agenda for
Integration – Framework
for the Integration of
Third Country Nationals
in the European Union,
COM(2005) 389, 1 Sep-
tember 2005
European Commission - Suggested actions to put the CBPs into practice
- Integration programs: civic orientation “ensuring that immigrants understand, respect
and benefit from common European and national values” and TCNs “acquire basic
knowledge about language, history, institutions, socioeconomic features, cultural life
and fundamental values”
- (*) Integration abroad; explicit nexus between legal migration and integration: “legal
migration and integration are inseparable and should mutually reinforce one another”
- Pre-departure integration measures consisting of “information packages and lan-
guage and civic orientation courses in the country of origin”
- Mainstreaming
- Common indicators (European criteria for the process of comparative learning), sta-
tistical tools, monitoring, evaluation, etc.
Report on Strategies
and Means for the Inte-
gration of Immigrants in
European Parliament - Two-way process principle – emphasis on the willingness and responsibility of TCNs
to integrate
- Integration abroad: diplomatic and consular authorities “to assist in integrating poten-
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the European Union, 17
May 2006
tial immigrants through familiarising them with EU and Member State culture, history,
language and civic rights and responsibilities”
- Awareness of the EU’s fundamental values
- Integration programs – “importance of encouraging the learning of the host society's
language and organising civic education courses”
Handbook on Integration
for Policy-Makers and
Practitioners, second
edition, May 2007
Migration Policy Group
(on behalf of the Euro-
pean Commission) and
NCPI
- Integration: “Integration is not easy to plan: it is a long-term process, and it is non-
linear. An international political event or a criminal act can set back integration proc-
esses significantly. Integration is also multi-faceted, demanding a capacity for
adaptation…including [by] immigrants themselves”; a pragmatic approach, looking at
“outcomes in terms of social and economic mobility, education, health, housing, so-
cial services and societal participation
- (=) The elimination of inequalities through a revival of the concept of civic citizenship
in light of “security of residence”
- (=) Revival of the concept of civic citizenship in light of security of residence
- The acquisition of competences (‘learning to learn’) through the acquisition of lan-
guage proficiency and training/education (‘empowerment also reinforces knowledge’)
Commission Staff Work-
ing Document, Second
Annual Report on Migra-
tion and Integration,
SEC(2006)892, 30 June
2006
European Commission - Trends in national policies on integration:
1) New immigrants to fulfill “integration obligations” and a tendency toward compul-
sory integration programs
2) Integration abroad: pre-departure standards before family reunification
- Rights considered to be the best way for TCNs to integrate
Communication on the
Third Annual Report on
Migration and Integra-
tion, COM(2007) 512,
11 September 2007
European Commission - Integration: a process of mutual accommodation by both the host societies and the
immigrants and an essential factor in realizing the full benefits of immigration…the
link between legal migration policies and integration strategies needs to be continu-
ally reinforced…the Common Agenda provides supportive EU mechanisms to
facilitate this process developing a distinctive European approach to integration”
- (*) Trends in national policies on integration: impact of the CBPs in member states
(Spain)
Benchmarking Integration in the EU | Page 80
- (*) Proposals to develop the common agenda: concepts of participation and citizen-
ship, common European modules for migrant integration (EMMI), awareness-raising
and dissemination, prevention of social alienation and discrimination of youth, index-
ing and benchmarking
Decision 2007/435/EC
establishing the Euro-
pean Fund for the
Integration of Third-
Country Nationals for
the Period 2007 to 2013
as part of the General
Program “Solidarity and
Management of Migra-
tion Flows, 27 June
2007,
Council - (*) General objectives:
1) to facilitate the development and implementation of “admission procedures”
relevant to and supportive of integration
2) to develop the integration of “newly-arrived third-country nationals” in the mem-
ber states
3) to increase the member states’ capacity to develop, implement, monitor and
evaluate policies on integration
4) to exchange information, best practices and cooperation among the member
states
Informal Meeting of EU
Ministers Responsible
for Integration in Pots-
dam, 10–11 May 2007
Member states, Euro-
pean Commission,
NCPI, etc
- (*) Active participation instead of civic citizenship
- (=) EMMI
- (=) Indexing and benchmarking
Justice and Home Af-
fairs Conclusions on
Strengthening of Inte-
gration Policies by
promoting Unity in Di-
versity, 12–13 June
2007
Council - (*) Integration part of the global approach to migration
- (*) “Promoting Unity in Diversity”
- Two-way process principle – “which should be underpinned by an agreed value sys-
tem”
- Obligations: TCNs “should make a deliberate effort to integrate, in particular learning
the language of their host society, and understanding the values of the European Un-
ion”
- EMMI
- (*) (In)security – radicalization and the role of integration programs to prevent social
alienation and radicalization (terrorism)
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- Indicators, indexing and benchmarking
- (*) Intercultural dialogue – integration of citizens of different origins, culture and relig-
ion
Justice and Home Af-
fairs Conclusions, 6 and
7 December 2007
Council - Integration as a tool of foreign policy – nexus between circular migration, mobility
partnerships and integration – “pre-departure information on labour market opportuni-
ties, language and skills training and other integration measures available to migrants
prior to arrival in the EU”
Communication, To-
wards a Common
Immigration Policy
COM(2007) 780, 5 De-
cember 2007
European Commission - (*) Integration: as a ‘continuum’, “running from entry, through settlement and to social
and economic inclusion”
- Nexus between legal migration and integration
- (=) Nexus between employment and integration (economic rationale)
- Principle of equality and non-discrimination
Source: Author’s compilation.
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ANNEX 3
THE INTEGRATION INDICATORS OF BERLIN 2007-2011
INDICATOR SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INDICATOR
Participation and the strengthening of civil society, in terms
of the shares of…
Persons with a municipal voting right to all persons with an
immigrant background in Berlin and the boroughs
Extent of political participation opportunities for persons with im-
migrant backgrounds
Representatives with an immigrant background in the mem-
bership of the House of Representatives
Extent of political participation opportunities for persons with im-
migrant background
Representatives with an immigrant background in the bor-
ough parliaments (by borough and total)
Extent of political participation opportunities for persons with im-
migrant background
Persons with an immigrant background in residents’ commit-
tees of the Neighborhood Management
Intercultural opening of the Neighborhood Management
Registered racist or anti-Semitic violence in relation to the
resident population
Extent of racist/anti-Semitic discrimination and violence
Suspects in all burglary offences from non-German and
German backgrounds
Burglary offences are an indicator of social deficits, which imply
the lack of integration
Victims (of criminal offences) among foreigners compared
with the number of suspects of German background
No explanation provided
Bi-national marriages (German–foreigner) and registered
partnerships to the total
Extent of familial combinations of Germans and foreigners
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INDICATOR SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INDICATOR
Judicial integration
Percentage of foreigners with an unlimited residence permit Legal security of abode in Germany
Foreigners with residence permit for more than 8 years Reference for naturalization potential
Proportion of naturalized persons to the total population for Berlin
and subdivided by borough
Maximum legal security; identification with the receiving society
Annual number of naturalizations Identification with the receiving society
Source: Author’s compilation, with reference to Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin (ed.), Encouraging Di-
versity – Strengthening Cohesion, Integration Policy in Berlin 2007-2011, Der Beauftragte für Integration und Migration, Berlin, 2007.
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ANNEX 4
MIPEX INDICATORS LIST215
1. LABOR MARKET ACCESS
1.1 Eligibility
1. Renewal of third-country nationals’ work permits
2. Ability to accept any employment (excluding exercise of public authority) equal to that of EU nation-
als
3. Ability to take up self-employed activity (excluding exercise of public authority) equal to that of EU
nationals
4. Procedures for recognition of academic and professional skills and qualifications
1.2 Labor market integration measures
5. Measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labor market (reduce unem-
ployment, promote vocational training, and encourage language acquisition)
6. State facilitation of the recognition of skills and qualifications obtained outside the EU
7. Equality of access to vocational training and study grants
1.3 Security of employment
8. Renewal of work permits
9. Termination of work contract is a reason for revoking or refusing to renew work/residence permit
1.4 Rights associated
10. Membership in trade union associations and work-related negotiation bodies
11. Changes in working status/permit (different employer, different job, different industry, different
permit category, etc.)
2. FAMILY REUNION
2.1 a) Eligibility for sponsor
12. Eligibility for legal residents
2.1 b) Eligibility for family members
13. Eligibility for the sponsor’s spouse and registered partner
14. Eligibility for minor children
15. Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line
16. Eligibility for dependent adult children
215 J. Niessen, T. Huddleston and L. Citron (in cooperation with A. Geddes and D. Jacobs), Migrant Integration
Policy Index, British Council and Migration Policy Group, Brussels, 2007 (see www.integrationindex.eu).
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2.2 Acquisition conditions (for sponsor and/or family members)
17. Integration measures
18. Imposition of integration course
19. Format of language assessment
20. Format of integration assessment
21. Content of integration assessment
22. Flexibility of all test criteria
23. Criteria for exemptions
24. Cost of test
25. Study guide
26. Accommodation requirement
27. Economic resources requirement
28. Length of application procedure
29. Costs of application and/or issue of permit or renewal
2.3 Security of status
30. Duration of validity of permit
31. Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status
32. Factors taken into account for refusal or withdrawal
33. Legal guarantees and redress in case of withdrawal or non-renewal of permit or expulsion order
2.4 Rights associated
34. Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority
35. Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members
36. Access to education and training for adult family members
37. Access to employment and self-employment
38. Access to social security and social assistance, health care and housing
3. LONG-TERM RESIDENCE
3.1 Eligibility
39. Required time of habitual residence, disregarding work activity
40. Required time in legal employment or self-employment
41. Period as pupil or student counted
42. Period awaiting asylum decision counted
43. Periods of absence from country allowed previous to granting long-term residence
3.2 Acquisition conditions
44. Integration measures
45. Imposition of integration course
46. Format of language assessment
47. Format of integration assessment
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48. Content of integration assessment
49. Flexibility of test criteria
50. Criteria for exemptions
51. Cost of test
52. Study guide
53. Economic resources requirement
54. Insurance requirement
55. Length of application procedure
56. Costs of application and/or issue of permit or renewal
3.3 Security of status
57. Duration of validity of permit
58. Renewable permit
59. Periods of absence allowed for renewal
60. Grounds for withdrawal
61. Factors taken into account for protection against expulsion
62. Groups precluded from expulsion
63. Legal guarantees and redress in case of withdrawal or non-renewal of permit or expulsion order
3.4 Rights associated
64. Residence right after retirement
65. Access to employment (only exception being from exercise of public authority), self-employment
and other economic activities
66. Access to social security, social assistance, health care and housing
67. Recognition of academic and professional qualifications
68. Freedom of movement and residence within the EU
69. Simultaneous holding of a long-term residence permit in more than one member state
4. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
4.1 Electoral rights
70. Right to vote in national elections (not weighted)
71. Right to vote in regional elections (any level of government between the lowest local and the high-
est national/federal)
72. Right to vote in local elections
73. Right to stand for elections at local level
4.2 Political liberties
74. Right to association, including political, for foreign residents
75. Membership in political parties
4.3 Consultative bodies
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76. Form of consultation of foreign residents at the national level
77. Composition of consultation body at the national level
78. Form of consultation of foreign residents at the regional level
79. Composition of consultation body at the regional level
80. Form of consultation of foreign residents at the local level in the capital city
81. Composition of consultation body of foreign residents at the local level in the capital city
82. Form of consultation of foreign residents in the city (other than the capital city) with the highest
proportion of foreign residents
83. Composition of consultation body of foreign residents in the city (other than capital city) with the
highest proportion of foreign residents in the population
4.4 Implementation policies
84. Active policy of information on political rights by national level (or regional level in federal states)
85. Public funding or support of immigrant organizations on national level
86. Public funding or support of immigrant organizations on regional level
87. Public funding or support of immigrant organizations in capital city
88. Public funding or support of immigrant organizations in city with highest proportion of foreign resi-
dents
5. ACCESS TO NATIONALITY
5.1 Eligibility
89. Years of residence required for ordinary naturalization of first-generation immigrants
90. Years of residence/marriage required for spouses of nationals
91. Years of residence required for partners/cohabitees of nationals
92. Automatic or restricted naturalization for second-generation immigrants (born in country, both par-
ents of the TCN born abroad)
93. Automatic or restricted naturalization for third-generation immigrants (born in the country, both
parents TCNs and at least one parent born in the country)
94. Periods of absence from country allowed prior to naturalization
5.2 Acquisition conditions
95. Language or integration measures
96. Format of language assessment
97. Format of citizenship assessment
98. Costs of tests
99. Format of study guide
100. Cost of study guide
101. Name change for applicants for naturalization
102. Requirements for oaths, declarations or ceremonies that are tantamount to denial or exclusion
103. Economic resources requirement
104. Health insurance requirement
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105. Criminal record requirement
106. ‘Good character’ requirement
107. Maximum length of application procedure set down in law
108. Costs of application and/or issue of nationality title
5.3 Security of status
109. Grounds for refusing or withdrawing citizenship
110. Time limits for withdrawal as prescribed in law
111. Legal prohibitions against withdrawal that would lead to statelessness
112. Factors taken into account before refusal or withdrawal
113. Legal guarantees and redress in case of withdrawal
5.4 Dual nationality
114. Requirement to renounce/lose foreign nationality upon naturalization
115. Dual nationality for children of TCNs born in the country
116. Ratification of Council of Europe’s 1997 European Convention on Nationality
6. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
6.1 Definitions and concepts
117. Definition of discrimination includes direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and instruction
to discriminate on race and ethnicity, religion and belief and nationality, hereafter referred to as ‘all
three grounds’
118. Definition of discrimination includes discrimination by association and on the basis of assumed
characteristics on all three grounds
119. Anti-discrimination law applies to the public/private sector and to natural and legal persons
120. Law prohibits public incitement, public threats/defamation and instigation to commit offenses on
all three grounds
121. All three grounds covered in employment and vocational training
6.2 Fields of application
122. All three grounds covered in education (primary and secondary level)
123. All three grounds covered in social protection, including social security
124. All three grounds covered in social advantages
125. All three grounds covered for access to and supply of goods and services available to the public,
including housing
126. All three grounds covered for access to supply of goods and services available to the public, in-
cluding health
6.3 Enforcement
127. Access for victims, irrespective of grounds of discrimination, to all procedures
128. Access for victims on all three grounds
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129. Average length of both judicial civil and administrative procedures
130. Shift in burden of proof in all procedures
131. Protection against victimization in all relevant sectors
132. State assistance for victims
133. Powers of legal entities with a legitimate interest in defending the principle of equality to assist
victims
134. Range of sanctions available in discrimination cases
135. Discriminatory motivation treated as aggravating circumstance for all three grounds
6.4 Equality policies
136. Mandate of specialized equality agency on all three grounds
137. Powers of specialized agency to assist victims
138. Legal standing of specialized agency in different procedures
139. Powers of specialized agency to initiate proceedings and investigations
140. Legal obligations of the state on information, social dialogue and civil society dialogue on dis-
crimination
141. Legal obligations of the state to promote equality in lawmaking, administration, service delivery
and recruitment
142. All three grounds covered for restriction of freedom of association, assembly and speech
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ANNEX 5
FRAMEWORK FOR IDENTIFYING IMPEDIMENTS AND AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT
Source: J. Niessen and T. Huddleston (with N. Verbruggen and M. A. Kate), Setting up a System of
Benchmarking to Measure the Success of Integration Policies in Europe, Policy Department C, Citi-
zens Rights and Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament, PE 378.288, January 2007, Figure 5d.
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ANNEX 6
EXCHANGING AND LEARNING FROM GOOD PRACTICES
Organizations can learn from each other, whether they are governmental or non–governmental
agencies, working at the same or different governance level, when hey design and implement
policies or when they carry out concrete programs and projects.
The process includes the following steps:
• Describe in some detail the policy areas and integration programs on which the exchange will
take place and what the expected outcomes are.
• Decide whether the aim is to replicate practices of the partner organisation, to adapt its prac-
tices to their own situation, or to change and develop new practices together with the partner.
• Identify one or more potential partners and negotiate and agree on principles governing the
exchange process (for example, by adhering to the European Benchmarking Code of Con-
duct of the European Foundation for Quality Management).
• Allocate human and other resources to the exercise, create commitment among the organiza-
tion’s staff and demonstrate this commitment to partner(s).
• Decide on a program and timeframe, designate staff, agree on an internal and external com-
munication strategy, bring own staff and that of the partners together and build an exchange
team based on competence and trust.
• Identify data sources and agree on how information will be generated, handled (especially
where it concerns confidential data) and exchanged. Determine and bridge or deal with data
gaps.
• Engage in in-depth exchanges through site visits, preparing general background material on
integration policies, giving detailed presentations on program implementation and formulating
learning points.
• Establish to what extent situational differences influence not only expectations of outcomes of
policies and practices, but also their actual impact. Develop common criteria to measure ef-
fectiveness and efficiency.
• Compare policies and practices and formulate strengths and weaknesses. Highlight critical
success factors and identify hurdles. Establish lessons learned and make recommendations
on how to apply them.
• Evaluate the exercise, share the outcomes with stakeholders and adapt policies and prac-
tices accordingly.
Source: Niessen, J. and Y. Schibel, Handbook on Integration for Policy Makers and Practitioners,
DG Justice, Freedom and Security, European Commission, European Communities, Second Edi-
tion, May 2007, p. 11.
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ANNEX 7
BENCHMARKING INTEGRATION GOVERNANCE IN EUROPEAN CITIES:
BENCHMARKING MODEL
CATEGORY GENERAL GOVERNANCE – CONTENT/INDICATORS
Ambition 1. Describe whether and how a needs assessment has been used to inform
the strategic plan for the integration of migrants. Is this plan used as a
‘blueprint’ for implementation of policy measures, and if so how?
2. Explain whether and how the strategy is integrated into all relevant policy
portfolios and at all stages of the policy development process.
3. Describe whether there is an officer that is appointed as the integration
focal point (‘Integration Agent’), and provide his/her details. Explain their
relationship with the inter-departmental committee on integration.
4. What measures of effectiveness are used to measure the effectiveness of
the Integration Agent in promoting and ensuring mainstreaming of migrant
integration in the municipality’s policy work?
5. Describe the strategy for liaising with regional, national and European lev-
els of governance.
6. Explain the rationale or logic used by the municipality in deciding what data
to collect and use on migrant communities, including on settlement pat-
terns.
Leadership 1. Have political leaders made a public commitment that migrant integration is
a key priority for resources and action, and if so what exactly have they
committed to?
2. Explain whether and how elected members and senior staff are committed
to making migrant integration a policy priority and are committed to achieve
its objectives.
3. What commitment has each political party made to the principles of migrant
integration and the strategic plan adopted by the municipality? Does this
commitment go beyond a single mandate period?
4. Explain whether and how leaders of the municipality highlight the contribu-
tion of migrants to the city and the community. Is volunteer commitment
and initiatives by migrant associations and individual migrants appreciated
and honored?
Resources 1. Describe the financial, staff and other resources made available by the
municipality for its integration-related activities and explain how this is ap-
propriate to achieve its objectives.
2. Describe whether there is a positive action policy used in relation to staff
recruitment and explain how this is strengthening the diversity of the work-
force.
3. How does the municipality include inter-cultural issues and migrants’ per-
spectives in relevant staff training programs?
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4. Describe whether there is a positive action policy for public procurement
and how this is strengthening the diversity of contractors and suppliers (i.e.
‘supplier diversity’).
5. Explain how you know that the municipality provides adequate funding to
migrant associations, including appropriate training.
Implementation 1. Describe the experience and resources available to the inter-departmental
committee for migrant integration.
2. Provide a list of the nominated contact persons in each department who
are responsible for managing the department’s contribution to the strategic
plan and monitoring successes and failures in migrant integration.
3. Is there a permanent consultative committee on migrant integration in
place? Provide a membership list demonstrating that it includes suitably
qualified and representative individuals from civil society, migrant associa-
tions and the private sector. Does the municipality consult the committee
on a regular basis? Provide evidence.
4. Has the municipality established negotiating and debating meetings and
other opportunities for migrants (and associations) and local residents (and
associations) to meet, exchange views and resolve potential conflicts? De-
scribe how.
5. Explain whether and how the municipality tailors its services and opportuni-
ties (or those of sub-contracted external agencies) to meet the needs of its
diverse population and to enhance the integration process of migrants, in-
cluding their potentials for full participation.
Evaluation 1. Explain whether and how the municipality carries out a regular evaluation
of the achievements of its migrant integration policy and practice (including
their strategic and implementation aspects). Is this communicated to all
relevant stakeholders? Provide examples.
2. Does the municipality regularly report to the public on the results of its mi-
grant integration policy? Explain how and provide examples.
3. Provide examples of the indicators used to measure success and failure in
both processes and outcomes, and explain how these are kept up to date.
4. Does the municipality evaluate whether intermediary and other partners
are satisfied with progress toward objectives and whether they ‘feel’ val-
ued, and if so how?
5. Explain how the municipality understands why policies are not working.
6. Give examples of key success factors and best practices and demonstrate
how they are used in policy planning.
7. Illustrate how the municipality is open to third-party evaluation.
Source: INTI Cities, “Guidance on How to Prepare the Initial Report”, INTI Cities Project, Brussels,
2008 (retrieved from http://www.inticities.eu/en).
Benchmarking Integration in the EU | Page 94
ANNEX 8
THE MITI PROJECT SET OF INDICATORS
1. Index of absorptive capacity
1.1. Indicator of the size of the foreign population (foreign residents in a region as % of the national
total)
1.2. Indicator of the foreign proportion of the population (foreign residents as % of total population
of the region)
1.3. Indicator of the increase in the foreign population (% change in the foreign population in a re-
gion over a 10-year period)
1.4. Indicator of long-term residence (% of foreign population resident in the country for at least 5
years or, for those countries where this data is not available, at least 10 years)
2. Index of social stability
2.1. Indicator of poor housing (% of the foreign population living in overcrowded housing):
a) Gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the average for nationals;
b) Gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the regional figure for nationals
2.2. Health indicator (% of total population suffering from some form of disability):
a) Gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the average for nationals;
b) Gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the regional figure for nationals
2.3. Indicator of mixed marriage:
a) Gap between the regional marriage rate for immigrants (number of marriages per year in each
region, in which at least one partner is a non-EU national per 10,000 residents) and the national
marriage rate of nationals (number of marriages per year in the country, in which at least one part-
ner is a national per 10,000 residents);
b) % of mixed marriages (partners of different nationalities) per year as a proportion of total mar-
riages, for each region
3. Labor market index
3.1. Indicator of unemployment (unemployment rate: the unemployed as a % of the labor force):
a) Gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the average for nationals;
b) Gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the regional figure for nationals
3.2. Indicator of sectoral distribution of activity (% of non-nationals and nationals in each sector, for
each region)
3.3. Indicator of occupational status of the immigrant labor force (the proportion of workers in the
highest three occupational groups, based on the International Standard Classification of Occupa-
tions of the International Labor Organization):
a) Gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the average for nationals;
b) Gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the regional figure for nationals
3.4. Educational level of the foreign labor force (% of persons with a university degree in the labor
force):
a) Gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the average for nationals;
b) Gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the regional figure for nationals
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3.5. Indicator of immigrant activity rate (% of the labor force in the population aged 15-74):
a) Gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the average for nationals;
b) Gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the regional figure for nationals
3.6. Income level of immigrants (annual gross per capita income in euros for each region):
a) Gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the average for nationals; and
b) Gap between the regional figure for non-EU nationals and the regional figure for nationals.
Source: C. Withol De Wenden et al. (2008), Measuring Integration: The French Case – Regional
indices of social and labour market inclusion of third-country nationals, Final Report, Sciences Po,
CERI, March 2008 (retrieved from http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org).
